Three-year-olds\u27 reasoning about deceptive objects : can actions speak louder than words? by Sylvia, Monica R.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-2002
Three-year-olds' reasoning about deceptive objects
: can actions speak louder than words?
Monica R. Sylvia
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sylvia, Monica R., "Three-year-olds' reasoning about deceptive objects : can actions speak louder than words?" (2002). Doctoral
Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 3297.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/3297

THREE-YEAR-OLDS' REASONING ABOUT DECEPTIVE OBJECTS
CAN ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS?
A Dissertation Presented
by
MONICA R. SYLVIA
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
September 2002
Psychology
© Copyright by Monica R. Sylvia 2002
All Rights Reserved
THREE-YEAR-OLDS' REASONING ABOUT DECEPTIVE OBJECTS:
CAN ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS?
A Dissertation Presented
by
MONICA R. SYLVIA
Approved as to style and content by:
>?7 ui
Marvin W. Daehler, Co-Chair
Melinda A. Novak, Member
(UULf_
Richard L. Freyman, Membdf
Melinda A. Novak, Department Head
Psychology
DEDICATION
For their many years of loving support and encouragement,
this dissertation is dedicated to my parents,
Ronald and Delia Sylvia.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank the members of my committee, Melinda Novak and
Richard Freyman, as well as Mike McCarty, for their time and helpful suggestions in
the development of this dissertation. Special thanks to Marvin Daehler, co-chair of the
committee, for taking this project under his wing. Without his dedication, patience,
and thoughtful insight, this project would not have been possible. Many thanks, also,
to my advisor and committee co-chair, Rachel Clifton, for five years of patient
guidance and support. Together, you have set the standards for innovative research and
a commitment to student development that I will continually strive to meet in my own
career.
My sincere appreciation goes to all of the parents and children who participated
in this project. Their interest and enthusiasm was truly inspirational. Thanks to Katie
Sears, and most especially, Anica Pless, for their tireless efforts in recruiting, running
subjects, and scoring the data. Endless thanks also goes to Neil Berthier, for all of his
time, patience, and constant willingness to provide statistical support.
Finally, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to the faculty and students of my
department for providing an intellectually challenging and supportive environment. I
am especially grateful to Kristen Asplin, Renee Johnson, and Laura O'Sullivan for their
infinite supply of tissues, coffee, words of encouragement, and true friendship. Most
importantly, thanks to my parents and grandmother, Ronald and Delia Sylvia and Mary
Santos, for their many years of encouragement and emotional support. Without their
love, personal sacrifice, and prayers, none of this would have been possible.
v
ABSTRACT
THREE-YEAR-OLDS' REASONING ABOUT DECEPTIVE OBJECTS:
CAN ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS?
SEPTEMBER 2002
MONICA R. SYLVIA, B.A., FAIRFIELD UNIVERSITY
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professors Marvin W. Daehler and Rachel K. Clifton
The appearance-reality distinction refers to the understanding that objects can
have misleading appearances that contradict reality. Traditionally, studies
investigating children's ability to make this distinction have used a verbal-based task
that requires children to answer two questions regarding the appearance and reality of a
target object whose appearance has been altered. In general, these studies have found
that children are not successful in this task until 4-5 years of age.
The purpose of the current study was to investigate three different hypotheses
regarding why 3-year-olds fail the traditional verbal-based task in order to determine
whether their poor performance truly represents an inability to distinguish appearance
from reality. In Experiment 1, the hypothesis that 3-year-olds fail the traditional task
simply because they are unfamiliar with the property-distorting devices typically used
to alter the appearances of target objects, rather than an inability to distinguish
appearance from reality, was examined. Experiments 1 and 2 also examined the
hypothesis that 3-year-olds' failure in this task may be due to an inability to assign
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conflicting, dual representations to a single object. Finally, the role of the language
used in making the appearance-reality distinction also was examined in both
experiments. In this case, the hypothesis that 3-year-olds may be able to distinguish
appearances from reality in an action-based, but not verbal-based task, was evaluated.
In Experiment 1, all of this was done using a property-distorting device typically used
in traditional appearance-reality studies, whereas a completely new method for altering
the appearances of objects was used in Experiment 2.
No supporting evidence for the familiarity or dual representation hypotheses
was found in either experiment, however, children in both experiments performed
better on an action-based task than on two verbal-based tasks. Children went from
answering the traditional appearance-reality questions on the basis of misleading
perceptual information to overriding this misleading information in an action-based
task. Together, these results provide evidence that 3-year-olds have some competence
in distinguishing appearances from reality that is masked by the language demands ol
the traditional verbal-based task.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
11lc Appearance-Reality D istinction
Understanding that objects and events in the world may have misleading
appearances that arc contradictory to reality lies at the heart of the appearance-reality
distinction. Everyday, situations arise in which our abilities to understand this
distinction guide our behavior. For instance, have you ever smelled or checked the
expiration date on the side of a container of milk before pouring its contents onto your
cereal? Most likely, you did this because you have noticed that sour milk looks
deceivingly like fresh milk. In another case, familiarity with the warning, "objects in
mirror are closer than they appear", may have caused you to turn your head and check
over your shoulder before switching lanes in traffic rather than relying on your side-
view mirror. In instances such as these, failure to distinguish appearances from reality
could have unpleasant or even fatal consequences.
As the above examples illustrate, distinguishing appearance from reality is a
common aspect of everyday adult life. Making this distinction, however, also is
important in the lives of young children. For example, consider the appearance of
common household cleaning solutions. Often, these liquids look like common
beverages such as water or juice. In such cases, one must take the extia step ol reading
a label or smelling the liquid in order to identify it; something must be done in order to
distinguish between its appearance and reality. Moreover, because many adults
recognize the danger involved in failing to distinguish between appearance and
i ealitv
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in this situation, they often keep these household cleaning solutions out of children's
reach. Concern over young children’s failure to distinguish appearance from reality in
situations such as these raises the question, "When do young children come to
understand that things are not always as they appear?".
Historically, research investigating the development of young children's
understanding of the appearance-reality distinction has centered on Piagetian tasks of
conservation. In these tasks, children often are asked to make a comparison between
two stimuli that initially are identical with regard to a target property. For example,
they may be presented with two rows of aligned blocks and be asked to judge whether
the rows contain an equal number of blocks. Following this initial comparison, one of
the two arrays typically is transformed to create the appearance that it is now somehow
different from its companion. In the example used here, the spacing between the
blocks in one row may be altered so that one row now appears to be longer and
consequently, have more blocks in it, than its comparison row. With both the
transformed and untouched stimuli in view, children again are asked to judge the two
stimuli with regard to the target property. Children who understand that objects can
have deceiving appearances are expected to provide the same answer to both the pre-
and post-transformation questions, thereby demonstrating their knowledge that the
transformation did not truly alter the target property of the transformed stimulus. They
generally do not provide such answers, however, until 7-8 years of age (see Braine &
Shanks, 1965a, 1965b, Murray, 1965, 1968, and Russell & Mitchell, 1985, for
examples).
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Although Piagetian tasks of conservation provide an illustration of the difficulty
that children have in distinguishing appearance from reality, research involving the
appearance-reality distinction has shifted over the past 30 years toward tasks centered
on the development of children's theory ot mind. In this realm, the appearance-reality
distinction has been a key component of numerous false-belief tasks. Although a
variety of false-belief tasks have been designed, the unexpected-contents task most
closely resembles the conservation task just described. In this paradigm, children
initially are shown a clearly marked container (e.g. a crayon box) and are asked to
guess its expected contents (e.g. crayons). Following this, an experimenter reveals the
actual, unexpected contents of the container (e.g. candy is removed from the crayon
box). Once revealed, the contents are returned to the container and the container alone
remains in view. Children then are asked to identify both what is currently in the
container and what someone else who has not seen the contents of the container
revealed will think is in the container (see Chandler & Hala, 1994, and Gopnik &
Astington, 1988 for additional examples). Children who understand that appearances
can be misleading (e.g. that a crayon box that looks like it should hold crayons actually
could contain candy) have an important piece of information that will enable them to
respond with different answers to these questions. If they do not understand the
distinction, however, their answers either should both correspond to the misleading,
expected contents of the container or should both correspond to its actual, unexpected
contents. Unlike conservation tasks, children presented with this task succeed at
making this distinction by 4-5 years of age (Flavell, 1993; Flavell & Miller, 1998).
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In addition to its role in false-bcliel tasks, the appearance-reality distinction
also has been recognized recently in theory of mind investigations of the development
of pretend play. Unlike the tasks examined thus far, however, no standard task or test
situation has been used to investigate children's pretend play. Despite this fact, it is
clear from observing the behavior of children who are engaged in pretend play that this
situation incorporates a type of appearance-reality distinction. For instance, pretend
play often revolves around the use of familiar objects for novel, unrealistic purposes,
such as when children pretend that a banana is a telephone. In this example, children
undoubtedly know that a banana typically is eaten and really is food, however, they
suspend their judgment about this object to permit it to "appear" different from what it
is in reality. Consequently, just as objects are transformed to create an illusory
appearance in traditional conservation tasks (e.g. equal length rows of blocks are made
to appear unequal), and are used for unexpected purposes in false-belief tasks (e.g.
crayon boxes contain candy), they also are "transformed" by children through pretense
in pretend play situations (e.g. bananas become telephones). In instances of pretend
play, children appear capable of dealing with this distinction at a very rudimentary
level by 12-18 months of age (Flavell & Miller, 1998).
As the descriptions of the traditional conservation and theory of mind tasks
presented here suggest, these areas share striking similarities with regard to the
requirements for distinguishing appearance from reality. For instance, each task
involves transforming a target property or the identity of an object and asking children
to make judgments about that object or, in the case of pretend play, behave in a way
that corresponds to a new, unrealistic identity for that object. Despite this fact, an
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appreciation of the appearance-reality distinction is not the sole ingredient for success
in these tasks. In the conservation task, children must not only be able to make the
distinction between appearance and reality with regard to an array of stimuli, but they
also must be able to remember and recognize its relationship to a comparison stimulus
both before and after it has been transformed. In the false-belief tasks, on the other
hand, children must go beyond their appreciation ol this distinction to reason about the
beliefs of others. Moreover, they must attribute one belief to themselves (i.c. a belief
centered on the reality ot a target objeet) while assigning a conflicting belief to a
second person (i.e. a belief about how a target object appears). Finally, it can be
argued that while an understanding of the appearance-reality distinction may be useful
to children engaged in pretend play, it is not a pre-requisite for engaging in such
behavior. This line of reasoning stems from the realization that many pretend play
situations do not involve two equally plausible states of the world, that is, the target
object usually never is confused with what a child pretends it to be. One never will see
a real banana that works as a functional telephone! As a result, children cannot be
“misled” in pretend play situations to the point that they must make an effort to
distinguish appearance from reality.
The Traditional Annearance-Kealitv Task
Because of the varying demands associated with each of the tasks described
thus far, children’s suecess and/or failure at such tasks cannot be taken as direct
evidence of their understanding of the appearance-reality distinction. Despite this fact,
it cannot be denied that the ability to distinguish appearance lrom reality does play
an
integral role in these and other areas of cognitive development. Perhaps for this
reason,
5
researchers over the past 20 years have sought to understand the development of this
distinction in and of itself. Although a variety of different materials have been used to
investigate its development, the procedures and questions used to probe children’s
understanding of the distinction between appearance and reality remain consistent from
study to study. As a result, it is possible to speak ol a traditional appearance-reality
task, a task at which most children do not succeed until 4-5 years of age (Flavell,
1986).
Task Materials, Procedures, and Types of Errors
In the traditional appearance-reality task, children often are familiarized with
the terms used to refer to the appearance-reality distinction during a pre-training
session. For example, Flavell, Green, and Flavell (1986) introduced children to a
Charlie Brown puppet during the pre-training sessions of several of their experiments.
After covering the puppet with a ghost costume, the experimenter explained that,
“When you look at this with your eyes right now, it looks like a ghost." S/he
continued, “It looks like a ghost to your eyes, but really and truly, it isn’t. It’s really
and truly Charlie Brown." At this point, the experimenter removed the costume from
the puppet in order to demonstrate that it indeed still was Charlie Brown. S/he then
concluded, “Sometimes things look one way to your eyes when they really and truly
are a different way” (pp. 7-8).
Following a pre-training session similar to the one just described, children
typically are presented with a new stimulus and are asked to make a judgment about a
target property (e.g. “What color is this?”) or the identity (e.g. What is this? ) of that
object. They then watch as a transformation is made to the target property of that
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stimulus via an illusion (e.g. a white cutout of a flower is placed behind a green filter,
making the flower appear green) or new knowledge is imparted about the true identity
of the stimulus (e.g. children are shown and told that the stimulus initially labeled as a
rock really is a soft, absorbent sponge). With the transformed or newly identified
stimulus in view, children are asked two test questions, one about the appearance of the
object (e.g. ' What does it look like to your eyes right now?”) and one about its reality
(e.g. Really and truly, what is it?”). It is reasoned that if children understand the
appearance-reality distinction, they will respond to these questions with two different
answers, in this case, with the first corresponding to the illusory appearance and the
second to reality (Flavell et al., 1986).
In general, Flavell and colleagues have found that fewer than half of all 3 -year-
olds answer both appearance and reality questions correctly, with results ranging from
as few as 25 % to as many as 45 % of children responding correctly in any given study
(e.g. Flavell et al., 1986; Flavell, Green, Wahl, & Flavell, 1987; Krause & Saamio,
1993; Saap, Lee, & Muir, 2000). Moreover, when numerous trials are presented using
different objects and/or object properties, children typically respond correctly on only
30-40 % of the trials (e.g. Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1983; Flavell et al., 1986).
As the examples just provided suggest, the materials used in the majority of
these studies typically fall into one of two categories based on the type of distinction
that is required. The first category includes distinctions that must be made between the
apparent and real properties of objects. These properties often include color, size, and
shape. The second category involves distinctions that must be made between the real
and apparent identities of objects. This category includes objects that appear to be one
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kind but are an alternate kind of object in reality (e.g. a sponge that looks like a rock or
an eraser that looks like a piece of candy) (Flavell, 1986).
By using materials from each of the two categories just described, researchers
have gained valuable insight into the types of errors that children make. The first type
of error, referred to as the phenomenism error, involves answering both appearance and
reality questions with the same response corresponding only to the misleading
appearance of the target object. A number of studies have found that children most
often make this error when they are required to distinguish between the real and
apparent properties of objects. The predominance of phenomenism errors in these
situations suggests that children do not appreciate the fact that objects whose
appearances have been transformed temporarily by, for instance, placing them behind a
colored filter, retain their original properties. The intellectual realism error, on the
other hand, occurs when children respond to both appearance and reality questions with
the same answer corresponding only to the true identities or original appearances of the
target objects. In this case, a number of studies have found that children most often
produce intellectual realism errors when required to make a distinction between the real
and apparent identities of an object. The predominance of this type of error suggests
that once children discover the true identities of objects that have misleading
appearances, they are unable or unwilling to express the conflicting appearances and
realities of these objects (See Flavell, 1988 for review).
Task Demands of the Traditional Appearance-Reality Task
Despite the above variations in the types of stimuli used, it is important to re-
emphasize that the procedure itself and, more importantly, the questions used to test
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children's understanding of the appearance-reality distinction, remain remarkably
consistent from study to study using this task. Because of this consistency, it is
possible to examine a number of specific task demands that are placed on children in
this situation. For instance, it is clear that this task carries a significant demand for
memory. Children must remember either the original appearance of the object prior to
its transformation, or in the case ot objects that have misleading identities, what they
initially identified the target object as in order to answer the reality question correctly.
Moreover, in cases where a property such as size is targeted, they also must use their
memory tor the original size ot the object to make a comparison between the newly
transformed appearance of the object and its original appearance. Only through such
comparison can children come to label the target object as being either larger or smaller
than its transformed appearance (Flavell et al., 1986).
In addition to the demand for memory, the traditional task also requires children
to understand the invariability of certain object properties and identities. They must
understand not only how the illusions created by property-distorting devices such as
colored filters, lenses that distort the sizes and shapes of objects, etc. work, but also
that these devices truly do not change the crucial properties and/or identities of those
objects themselves (Murray, 1965). For instance, children must understand that
placing a white cutout of a flower behind a colored filter actually does not alter the
color of that flower nor does placing a small pen cap behind a magnifying lens alter its
size. In the case of object identities, children must understand that, for instance,
painting a sponge to look like a rock does not make the sponge hard enough to break a
window or unable to absorb a spill. If children do not understand this crucial aspect of
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object properties and identities, then they are doomed to failure in this task regardless
of their ability to distinguish appearance from reality.
Whereas a significant demand is placed on children's cognitive abilities by the
memory requirements and property-distorting devices used in this task, an equally
important demand lies in the language used to describe the appearance-reality
distinction. This demand is two-fold. First, children must understand the actual words
being used in the task, including the labels for the colors, sizes, objects, etc., as well as
the meanings of phrases including "looks like to your eyes" and "really and truly".
Secondly, they must be willing, able, and motivated to verbalize both their current
perceptions and memories of the original properties/identities of the objects in the face
of repeated questioning by the experimenter. Taken together, these two aspects of the
traditional task pose a significant challenge for young children who still might be at a
relatively preliminary stage of language development (Gauvain & Greene, 1994; Saap
et al., 2000).
Finally, it has been argued that the traditional appearance-reality task requires
children to hold and reason about dual representations; the same object must be thought
of in terms of how it both currently looks/is known to be and how it looked/was
thought to be prior to the crucial transformation (Flavell, 1986, 1993). Both of these
representations must be available simultaneously in order to answer the final test
questions correctly. Moreover, children in this situation must reason about two
different representations that often stand in direct conflict with each other. For
instance, when the target property is size, children must ascribe two representations to
the same object; a single object must be though of as being simultaneously both large
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and small. The ability to reason about such conflicting representations is seen by some
as a pre-requisite for success in this task.
Where's the Problem?
Because of the numerous task demands identified in the previous section,
understanding exactly which aspect of the traditional appearance-reality task causes the
greatest problem for young children presents quite a challenge. Do children fail this
task until the age of 4-5 years simply because they are unable to recognize the fact that
objects can have deceiving appearances, or is there a deficit in one of the previously
mentioned areas that leads to their failure? Researchers have explored the areas of
memory, understanding of illusions, language, and dual representation in an attempt to
determine exactly where the problem lies.
Memory
Although several investigations have been launched in the area of memory,
none have concluded that memory alone is the key factor that accounts for young
children's failure in the traditional task (e.g. Flavell et al., 1986; Flavell, Green, et ah,
1987; Rice, Koinis, Sullivan, Tager-Flusberg, & Winner, 1997). For instance, several
variations of the traditional task have been done using colored filters in combination
with specific probe questions in order to determine whether children remember the
original appearance of the target object prior to its transformation. In one such study,
3
-year-olds watched as a green cutout of a turtle was placed behind a red filter. They
then were asked, "If I pick up this thing (i.e. the filter) and take it away,
will that turtle
look black, like he does now, or will he look green?" (p. 133).
Twenty of the 24
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participants responded with the correct answer, compared to only 1 1 of the 24 who
responded to both traditional appearance-reality test questions correctly. Moreover, 24
out of 32 participants in a second group responded with the correct color when asked to
identify the color that a cutout would be if they were to walk around to the opposite
side ot the filter (Flavell, Green, et al., 1987). Similar results were obtained in Study 1
of Flavell et al. (1986), with 24 out of 32 subjects responding correctly to a similar
memory probe. Together, these results provide convincing evidence that 3-year-olds
are able to keep the original appearance of the target object in memory even after its
appearance has been altered.
Despite the results of these studies, it is important to note that providing 3-year-
olds with memory aids in the traditional task has led to improvements in performance
on several occasions. In these experiments, paper cutouts again were placed behind
colored filters. Unlike the traditional task, however, small portions of the cutouts
remained exposed. For example, a pink seal used in one study was partially placed
behind a green filter, leaving its tail exposed. In this situation, 19 out of 24 children
were able to answer the two traditional test questions correctly (Flavell et ah, 1986).
When handles of the same color were attached to four cutouts but left exposed once the
cutouts were place behind a colored filter, 22 out of 32 children responded correctly to
the two traditional test questions asked about 3 of 4 cutouts, and 1 6 of those children
were correct on all 4 (Flavell, Green, et ah, 1987). Finally, when the same age children
were presented with a rock that looked like a sponge placed between an actual rock and
an actual sponge during the questioning portion of the traditional task, 25 out of 34
children responded correctly to both traditional test questions (Rice et ah, 1997).
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Although the studies just mentioned found that providing 3-year-olds with a
memory aid impioved their performanee, certain limitations have been uncovered.
Flavell, Green, et al. (1987) found that in instances when a property such as color is
targeted, the memory aid must be physically attached to the target object in order for
performance to improve. In an additional condition of this study, a target cutout was
placed behind a colored filter while a stack of similar cutouts identical in color to that
of the target were left in clear view. In this case, the stack of cutouts should have
provided children with a memory aid for the original color of the target. This time,
however, only 1 1 of the 24 participants answered both test questions correctly.
Despite the above restriction, the mere fact that a memory aid attached to a
target object can result in improved performance in the traditional appearance-reality
task is intriguing. If children do not have a problem remembering the original
appearances of objects after the objects have been transformed, then why should the
presence of any type of memory aid result in improved performance? One possibility
may involve the amount of attention that children pay to the crucial properties and/or
identities of the objects about which they are being questioned. It is possible that the
presence of memory aids may help children focus their attention on the crucial
properties and identities of the objects at hand. By focusing their attention, these
memory aids may highlight the importance of considering the differences in the pre
and post-transformation properties/identities of the objects, thereby encouraging and/or
motivating them to reason carefully about the questions being asked.
In addition to the above attentional hypothesis, a second possibility for
children's increased performance in the context of certain memory aids may be that the
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presence of a memory aid lightens the informational processing load of the traditional
task. In this case, the memory aid is thought to help children hold in mind both
properties/identities ot the target object (i.e. the original property/identity and the
transformed one), thereby making them available for comparison. Consequently,
because examples of both representations of the target object are externally available,
children do not have to expend much cognitive effort trying to remember the two,
conflicting properties/identities. Instead, they can devote their cognitive resources to
making the crucial comparisons between these two properties/identities in order to
answer the traditional questions correctly (Rice et al., 1997).
A third hypothesis regarding the usefulness of memory aids is that the presence
of additional objects and/or options legitimizes the idea that two different answers for
the two traditional test questions are possible. According to this line of reasoning,
presenting children with only a single target object that has undergone a transformation
and asking two similar sounding questions regarding that object may be confusing.
This situation may mislead children into thinking either that the two questions are
essentially the same or that because there is only one object, there must be only one
answer to the questions. Presenting children with a memory aid that differs from the
transformed object with regard to the target property/identity somehow may help
children notice that two different questions are being asked and/or that these questions
may have two different answers (Rice et al., 1997).
Understanding Illusions and Property-Distorting Devices
The answer to why memory aids result in improved performance may lie in one
of the three hypotheses presented in the previous section, however, an
equally plausible
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possibility lies in the notion that memory aids may help children to understand the
illusions created and/or transformations used. As pointed out earlier, the traditional
appearance-reality task requires children to have a basic understanding of the
invariability of object properties and identities. Yet the possibility remains that the
majority of property-distorting devices used to create the illusions of typical
appearance-reality studies (e.g. colored filters, lenses that distort the shapes and sizes
of objects, etc.) may be completely new to children. As a result, they may not
understand that objects retain their original colors, sizes, shapes, etc. when these
devices are used. The presence of memory aids, however, may provide children with
insight into how these devices work. In some sense, children presented with the novel
property-distorting devices used in the traditional task may be seen as experiencing a
new problem and the memory aids may provide them with clues as to how this problem
can be solved.
The above line of reasoning alone may explain why Flavell, Green, et al. (1987)
found that memory aids result in improved performance only when they are attached to
the target objects themselves. Having a portion of an object remain exposed after it is
placed behind a property-distorting device such as a colored filter may help
demonstrate the fact that the entire object has not been altered permanently because
only the portion of the object located behind the device appears changed. Memory aids
that are unattached, on the other hand, never are placed behind such a device and
consequently, do not serve to illustrate this fact.
The hypothesis that memory aids may help children understand the illusions
used in the traditional appearance-reality task seems plausible especially in light of the
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results obtained in Study 1 of Flavell, Green, et al. (1087). As already pointed out, 3-
year-olds in this study watched as a green cutout of a turtle was placed behind a red
fi lter. 1 hey then weie asked what color the cutout would he il the experimenter were
t° remove the filter. In an additional condition, however, they were asked what the
coloi ol the cutout would be il they were to "'peck under the I liter. By simply
changing the phrase, “pick this thing (i.e. the filter) up and move it away” to “peek
under this thing
,
performance declined from 20 to 13 out of 24 children answering
correctly. 1 his response to the mere change in terms may shed light upon children's
understanding ol how the colored filter used worked. If children believed that the filter
actually changed the physical reality of the object, then they may have assumed that the
cut out would remain its new color as long as it was located behind/underneath the
filter. In this light, it would make sense that they would respond with the color that the
object appeared to be through the filter when asked what color it would be if they were
to “peek” under the filter because in this case, the object would remain under the filter.
Moreover, the mere word “peek” itself carries the connotation of “appearance”. In the
first condition, however, picking up the filter and moving it away may, in their minds,
result in the object being returned to its original color since it no longer would be
located behind/underneath the filter. In this case, moving the filter may have the
connotation of permitting the object to return to its original state.
The suggestion that memory aids may help children to understand the property-
distorting devices used points to a serious limitation ol the majority ot studies
employing the traditional appearance-reality task. As argued heie, the propeity-
distorting devices used in these studies often are new to children, yet despite this
lact.
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children often are passive observers during the pre-training sessions of most
appearance-reality studies. Only the experimenter typically handles these devices and
it is only s/he who actively changes the appearances of the target objects by, for
example, placing them behind colored filters (e.g. Flavell et al., 1983; Flavell et ah.
1986, Flavell, Green, et ah, 1987). This situation provides children with little
opportunity to learn or understand how these devices work. Consequently, it may be
this lack of experience with the property-distorting devices used, and not 3-year-olds’
lack ol understanding about the appearance-reality distinction, that is responsible for
their poor performance in traditional appearance-reality studies involving object
properties.
In an attempt to control for the problem of a lack of experience with the
materials used, Flavell et ah (1986) allowed children to actively manipulate two
colored filters during the pre-training session of one of their studies. After passively
watching an experimenter demonstrate how several filters changed the colored
appearance of an object, children were prompted to use a filter to “hide the real color”
of a toy car. They then were instructed to remove a second filter that already had been
placed in front of a powder puff in order to reveal the puffs true color. Following this
pre-training experience, children were given a traditional appearance-reality color task
with new objects and colored filters and were asked the traditional appearance and
reality questions. Flavell et ah found no improvement in the performance of 3-year-
olds based on their interactive pre-training experience with the property-distorting
devices.
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While the study carried out by Flavell and colleagues (Flavell et al., 1986) was
designed to give children direct experience with the type of property-distorting device
used, such experience was extremely limited. Children were allowed to cover one
object with a filter and remove a filter from a second object only once. More
importantly, they never were allowed to use the filter to both cover and uncover the
same object. As a result, they did not actively observe how the same object appeared
to change color when the filter was placed in front of it but changed back to its original
color when the filter was removed. In addition, children did not have the opportunity
to look behind the filter in order to observe that the object remained its original, true
color even when located behind the filter. Finally, children in this study interacted
with the filters only during pre-training, that is, they once again became passive
observers during the actual testing session when the experimenter alone manipulated
the filters and the objects.
The extent to which children truly became active participants in the study
carried out by Flavell et al. (1986) is questionable. A second study by Taylor and
Flavell (1984), however, further increased 3-year-olds' active experience in handling
the property-distorting devices used to distort the appearances of both the colors and
sizes of several target objects. In this study, colored transparent pieces of plastic were
placed around glasses of milk and lemonade in order to change their apparent colors
and a minifying lens was used to change the apparent size of a necklace. During
pre-
training, children were prompted to perform transformations using these property
-
distorting devices. For each item, they were encouraged to use the
devices to both
reveal the true colors and sizes of the objects as well as to change
their appearances to
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misleading colors and sizes. Following pre-training and after a brief, 3-minute break,
they were asked the traditional appearance-reality questions. This time, however, the
children were allowed to help the experimenter use the property-distorting devices to
make the objects appear different than they were in reality before being asked the
traditional test questions. In this situation, 24 of the 32 children questioned responded
with the appropriate answers to the appearance and reality questions for at least one of
the three objects presented. Such results were above the 4 out of 24 and 10 out of 24
children who responded appropriately to such appearance-reality questions regarding
the sizes and colors of at least two out of four target objects respectively in a similar
study (Flavell et al., 1983). Taylor and Flavell took this as evidence that these 3-year-
olds had at least some understanding of the appearance-reality distinction. This an
interpretation suggests that the poor performance of 3 -year-olds in the traditional task
actually may be due to a lack of active experience with the property-distorting devices
used rather than a lack of understanding about the appearance-reality distinction itself.
Language
Understanding Appearance-Reality Terms
Perhaps equally as important as children’s lack of familiarity with the property-
distorting devices used in traditional appearance-reality studies is the problem posed by
the traditional test questions themselves. One aspect of this problem lies in children s
understanding of the actual phrases used to describe the distinction, namely, looks like
to your eyes”, used to describe the target object’s transformed appearance, and "really
and truly”, used to refer to the object's true identity/original appearance. As several
19
researchers have pointed out, these phrases may be interpreted as something all
together different from what the experimenter has in mind. For instance, Flavell and
colleagues suggest that the phrase, looks like to your eyes ”, may be understood as
“probably is a(n) X”, while “really and truly is” may be taken to mean “really
resembles visually”, “appears to be a(n) X”, or “very/defmitely is a(n) X” (Flavell,
Green, et al., 1987; Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1990). Moreover, Taylor and Hort
(1990) suggest that children may not be attending closely enough to the experimenter’s
use of these key phrases to even recognize that two different questions are being asked.
The most that has been done to help children understand exactly what is meant
by the two key phrases used in the traditional task has been the addition of a pre-
training session similar to that described in the section on the traditional task. The
scenario presented in the pre-training session (i.e. a puppet wearing a costume),
however, is quite different from that in which the traditional test questions actually are
asked. Furthermore, there is no measure of children’s understanding of these phrases
during the pre-training session itself. As with much of the testing situation, children
are passive observers during the time that these key phrases are introduced and defined.
Consequently, little evidence exists to suggest that children understand the purpose or
even the content of this crucial demonstration (Saap et al., 2000).
The possibility that young children’s poor performances in the traditional
appearance-reality task may result from their failure to understand the key phrases used
to described this distinction is supported by the results of studies in which alternate
phrases have been used. In one such study, Flavell, Flavell, et al. (1987) found that
simply substituting the word "pretend" into the traditional appearance test question
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significantly improved performance. As in many studies using the traditional task, an
experimenter in this study explained and demonstrated the true and apparent identities
of each of several deceptive objects (i.e. a candle that looked like an apple, an eraser
that looked like candy, and a pad ol paper that looked like a sandwich). A second
experimenter then picked up the object and pretended that s/he was eating it. During
this time, 3 year-olds were asked either the traditional appearance-reality test questions
or the traditional reality question (e.g. “For real, is that thing really and truly an apple
or a candle?’ ), along with one of two substitute appearance questions (e.g. “Is that a
real apple or a pretend apple?” or “Is s/he (the second experimenter) pretending that is
a candle or is s/he pretending it’s an apple?”) (p. 819). Remarkably, children answered
only 36% of the traditional test question pairs correctly but answered 63% of the
pretend-reality question pairs correctly. In this case, simply replacing the phrase
“looks like” with the word “pretend” helped children to make the distinction between
the target object’s pretend appearance and its true identity.
In addition to pretense, several testing situations also have substituted questions
involving the edibility of deceptive food items for the traditional reality question. For
instance, Krause and Saarnio (1993) allowed 3-year-olds to handle a series of six
deceptive food items (e.g. a magnet that looked like candy). Following this, they asked
children the traditional appearance-reality test questions in addition to the following
substitute reality question: “If I (the experimenter) were very hungry, would it be okay
or not okay for me to eat this?" Although children answered an average of 87% of the
traditional appearance questions correctly, they answered an averaged of only 31% of
the traditional reality questions correctly. Despite this pattern, they responded to an
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average of 50% of the edibility questions correctly. Surprisingly, even though their
answers to the traditional questions appeared to indicate their belief that the target
items both looked like and really and truly were particular food items, they seemed to
know that the items really and truly were not edible.
Taken together with those of Flavell, Flavell, et al., (1987), the results obtained
by Krause & Saarnio (1993) suggest that 3-year-olds do have some understanding of
the appearance-reality distinction. Moreover, these results suggest that a key obstacle
for young children in the traditional task may be their understanding of the language
traditionally used to refer to the distinction. It is important to note, however, that there
may be something unique about pretense and food items that somehow makes these
two situations exceptional with regard to children’s general understanding of the
appearance-reality distinction. For instance, since most children engage in some form
of pretend play by the age of 12-18 months, many 3-year-olds may be comfortably
familiar with situations involving pretense. As Flavell, Flavell, et al. (1987) point out,
this familiarity may make it easier for them to distinguish between pretense and reality
than appearance and reality. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that children by
this age are practiced at, and most-likely have been explicitly taught, to distinguish
between edible and non-edible items, as confusion between the two may lead to
hazardous consequences (e.g. choking, poisoning, etc.). Because of this, additional
tasks outside of these two areas that simplify the language requirements of the
traditional appearance-reality task using stimuli and situations that are comparable to
those traditionally employed must be examined.
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A modified version ot the traditional appearance-reality task used by Flavell.
Green, et al. (1987) created a situation comparable to the traditional task but used
simplified language to question children about the distinction. In this task, 3-year-olds
were presented with each of two different scenarios. The first involved a cutout of a
flower that was placed behind a colored filter, making it appear a different color than it
was in reality. The second involved a portion of a box that was placed behind a
colored filter, again, making it appear to be a different color than it was in reality. In
the first instance, a piece of the flower was removed from behind the filter and children
were presented with two different pieces, one that matched the color that the flower
appeared to be through the filter and one that matched its true, original color. In the
second case, children were presented with two incomplete boxes, again, one that
matched the color that the portion of the box behind the filter appeared to be and one
that matched its true, original color. The children then were asked, “Where is the piece
I took away? Is it here or someplace else?" or in the case of the boxes, “Does the piece
(i.e. the portion of the box behind the filter) belong to one of these boxes or does it
belong to another box?". Because these questions required children to identify the true,
original color of the object located behind the filter, they essentially were viewed as
linguistically less challenging substitutes for the reality test question used in the
traditional task (e.g. “Really and truly, what color is it?”).
Of the 24 children questioned in the above study, 17 selected the piece that
matched the true, original color of the flower and 1 3 selected the box that matched the
true color of the portion located behind the filter. In comparison, only 1 1 of these
children were able to answer both of the traditional appearance-reality questions
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correctly in a control version of the task. Flavell, Green, et al. (1987), failed to make
much out of this difference. Instead, they argued that the mean number of children
selecting the correct piece/box (i.e.15 out ol 24 children) in the modified versions of
the traditional task was not significantly greater than the 1 1 out of 24 children who
responded correctly in the control version. As a result, they concluded that altering the
linguistic demands ot the task had little effect on children s performance. This
conclusion, however, downplays the fact that performance did improve greatly in the
flower version of the modified task, with the majority of children over-riding the
appearance of the flower located behind the filter when making their selections. This
especially is impressive in light of the fact that the predominate error made in
comparable traditional test situations involving the apparent and true properties of an
object is one of phenomenism (i.e. expressing that an object truly is the way that it
currently appears). If children were to make such an error in this situation, one would
expect that they would have selected the piece/box that matched the color that the
flower/portion of the box appeared to be through the filter. This, however, was not the
case.
Although the results obtained by Flavell, Green, et al. (1987) appear to support
the notion that a major problem for young children in the traditional appearance-reality
task involves the language used to describe this distinction, several aspects of the study
leave room for uncertainty. For instance, the range in ages ot the children tested was 2
years, 1 1 months through 4 years, 2 months, with a mean age of 3 years, 8 months.
Consequently, it is possible that a significant number of the children who made the
appearance-reality distinction in the modified version were those who were already
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close to 4 years of age. As mentioned earlier, children who are 4-5 years of age are
able to make this distinction in the traditional task. In addition, the children in this
study were presented with just one trial involving each of the two modifications
described. As a result, it is impossible to tell whether their success is representative of
their true knowledge regarding this distinction; the question of exactly how robust this
phenomenon is remains. Due to these factors, this study alone should not be taken as
conclusive evidence that the language used to describe the appearance-reality
distinction, and not young children’s lack of understanding regarding this distinction, is
a leading cause for their poor performance in the traditional appearance-reality task.
Further investigation must be done.
The Verbalization Requirement
In addition to young children’s abilities to understand the actual phrases used to
refer to the appearance-reality distinction, the language requirements of the traditional
task present a second problem involving young children’s motivation to verbalize their
responses in the face of repeated questioning by the experimenter. As alluded to in the
earlier section on task demands, children in the traditional task are reduced to passive
observers when it comes to the testing portion of the task. As previously described,
they simply are asked what a target object looks like and what its true
identity/appearance is in reality. Beyond the potential for being corrected by the
experimenter, there are few consequences for providing the wrong answers. This
factor may play a role in children's motivation to think carefully about the test
questions before providing their answers. As Taylor and Hort (1990) suggest, children
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may be more likely to think about or "figure out" the appearance-reality distinction if it
is important for them to actually use it.
According to the above line of reasoning, asking children to perform actions for
which making the appearance-reality distinction is necessary may motivate them to
think carefully about this distinction. In order to provide 3
-year-olds with clear
consequences for making, or failing to make, this distinction, Taylor and Hort (1990)
placed the distinction in the context of a letter-mailing game. After being tested on a
traditional appearance-reality color task, children were introduced to two puppets. It
was explained that one of the puppets, Mr. Green, only liked to receive green stars in
the mail while a second puppet, Mr. Rainbow, liked to receive stars of every color
except green. When the puppets received the wrong colored stars, they were very
disappointed. The children then were shown transparent colored envelopes each
containing a different colored star. When viewed through these envelopes, the stars
appeared to be different colors than they were in reality. The experimenter
demonstrated that in order to ensure that the puppets received only the colored stars
that they liked, one should look inside rather than through the envelope to determine
the true colors of the stars before mailing them. The children then were given several
transparent colored envelopes containing stars and were asked to mail them to the
appropriate characters. Following this task, they again were asked the traditional
appearance-reality questions in a version of the task using a colored filter.
Taylor and Hort (1990) found that after engaging in the letter-mailing game just
described, 3 -year-olds continued to fail the traditional appearance-reality task. Based
on these results, they concluded that even when the appearance-reality distinction
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carries consequences, there is no effect on children's abilities to reason about and report
this distinction correctly. This conclusion, however, ignores the children's
Performances during the actual letter-mailing game. In that situation, 24 out of the 25
children tested succeeded in mailing the appropriate colored stars to the correct puppets
the veiy first time that they were assigned this task. In other words, children did not
make the expected phenomenism error of mailing the stars that only looked like they
were the appropriate colors but instead, remembered to look inside the envelopes in
order to determine the true colors of the stars. This result opens the door to the
possibility that although 3-year-olds may not be able to verbalize their understanding
of the appearance-reality distinction, they may be able to demonstrate their
understanding of this distinction through their actions.
The performance of the 3-year-olds in the letter-mailing task just described
suggests that actively engaging children in a task where there are ramifications for
making the appearance-reality distinction does motivate them to take the appropriate
steps in order to distinguish appearance from reality. Conclusions regarding children's
true understanding of this distinction based on the results of this task alone, however,
must be made cautiously. Because children first were shown that they should look
inside the envelopes to determine the real colors of the stars, it is possible that they
simply ignored the fact that the envelopes made the stars appear to be different colors.
In other words, they may have assumed that the procedure for mailing the letters
included looking in the envelopes to observe the colors ol the stars before mailing
them, without any realization of the purpose or necessity ol this action (i.e. to
distinguish appearance from reality). 1 hus, the children in this study may have ne\ei
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considered mailing the stars to the puppets based on the colors that the stars appeared
to be when viewed through the envelopes. Consequently, this task may indicate only
that 3-year-olds can follow a demonstrated procedure and not that they truly understand
the necessity of using this procedure to make an appearance-reality distinction.
In addition to placing the appearance-reality distinction in an action-oriented
context, the task just described differed from the traditional appearance-reality task in a
second way. In traditional appearance-reality tasks centered on object properties such
as color, children are presented only with the misleading appearance of an object while
being questioned. As alluded to in previous sections, children are not able to "check"
on the actual appearance of the object before answering the two test questions, rather,
they must remember what the true color, shape, size, etc. of the object was before the
use of a property-distorting device altered its appearance. In the task designed by
Taylor and Hort (1990), however, children were able to verify the true color of the stars
immediately before mailing them. It therefore is possible that this opportunity, and not
the fact that the task carried certain consequences for making the distinction, was
responsible for children's success in the letter-mailing task.
In a second study aimed at designing an action-oriented appearance-reality task
which allowed for more active child participation, Gauvain & Greene (1994) presented
2, 3, and 4-year-olds with a series of 5 deceptive objects during a traditional
appearance-reality task and a "demonstration" task. During the traditional task,
children were shown each object and asked the traditional appearance and reality
questions. During the demonstration task, on the other hand, children were asked
to
physically demonstrate the true functions of these same objects. In this task,
each
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deceptive object was paired with a second, non-deceptive object that matched the
deceptive one in appearance only (e.g. a sponge that looked like a rock was paired with
an actual rock, a pencil that looked like a toothbrush was paired with an actual
toothbrush, etc.). Each pair of objects was presented along with two props, one of
which afforded a demonstration ol the true function, and consequently, the true
identity, of the deceptive object and one that could be used in accordance with either
the appearance of the deceptive object or with the non-deceptive object. For example,
the props that accompanied a deceptive pencil-toothbrush and an actual toothbrush
were a piece of paper on which the children could write and a doll that had dirty teeth.
In this case, the piece of paper afforded a demonstration of the pencil-toothbrush (i.e.
writing on the paper with that particular prop) and the doll afforded a demonstration of
the use of either the actual toothbrush or a demonstration of the pencil-toothbrush
based on the appearances of these props (i.e. brushing the doll's teeth). In every case,
each prop was labeled and the children were asked, “Can you show me something you
can do with these things (pointing to the props) using these things (pointing to the
deceptive and non-deceptive objects)?") (p. 316).
The primary area of interest in the above study involved the demonstration task
performances of children who had made phenomenism errors in the traditional verbal
task (i.e. those children who claimed that the objects truly were what they appeared to
be). If these errors truly were indicative of children s understanding of the deceptive
objects, then the children who made these errors should have used the objects in a
manner consistent with their appearances, and not their true identities, during the
demonstration task. For each of the 3 age groups (i.e. 2-, 3-, and 4-year-olds),
there
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were a total of 60 traditional verbal task trials. On these verbal trials, 2-year-olds
made phenomenism errors on a total of 20 trials, 3-year-olds did so on a total of 20
trials, and 4-year-olds did so on a total ol 6 trials. When given the opportunity to
demonstrate the functions/true identities of the deceptive objects on which these verbal
phenomenism errors were made, however, the 2-, 3-, and 4-year-olds did so correctly
in 95%, 75%, and 100% of these instances, respectively. In essence, children as young
as 2 years of age who responded incorrectly in the traditional appearance-reality task
(i.e. committed phenomenism errors) were able to demonstrate their knowledge
regarding the true identities of these same objects in an action-oriented appearance-
reality task which demanded active participation. Together, these findings suggest that
children may be able to express their understanding of the true identities of deceptive
objects in action-oriented appearance-reality tasks even when they cannot do so in a
traditional verbal task.
Although the results just described appear to suggest that children do
understand the appearance-reality distinction at some level, it is important to keep in
mind that the deceptive objects were paired with visually matching, non-deceptive
objects during the demonstration task of this study. It can be argued, therefore, that
children came to perform the appropriate actions with the deceptive objects through a
process of elimination. According to this argument, children may have tirst paired the
non-deceptive object with its appropriate prop when demonstrating the function ot that
object. For instance, when given the toothbrush and the pencil-toothbrush along with a
piece of paper and a doll with dirty teeth, children may have automatically paired the
toothbrush with the doll and demonstrated the appropriate action (i.e. brushing the
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doll’s teeth). Following this action, they would have been left with the remaining,
unused prop and the deceptive object, in this case, the piece of paper and the pencil-
toothbrush. Since this second prop would have afforded only an action in accordance
with the true function/identity of the deceptive object, in this case writing, this situation
may have led children to investigate the deceptive object closely in order to uncover its
true function. In other words, left with the unused prop and the deceptive object,
children may have been motivated to think about and eventually perform an action that
was appropriate for the true function of the deceptive object. If this were the case,
children who had no understanding of the appearance-reality distinction may have been
able to behave appropriately merely as the result of the circumstances surrounding the
testing situation of the demonstration phase.
When examining the results of the study by Gauvain and Greene (1994), it
also is important to keep in mind that realism, and not phenomenism, errors are the
primary errors observed in this and other traditional tasks involving the identities of
deceptive objects. Although looking at the demonstration task performances of
children who commit verbal phenomenism errors in the traditional task is interesting,
the demonstration phase of this study provides no insight into the thinking of children
who commit verbal realism errors in the traditional task. Consequently, the question of
whether the language demands present in traditional appearance-reality tasks are a
problem for children who commit realism errors in these tasks remains.
Whereas the demonstration task created by Gauvain and Greene (1994)
eliminated the language demands of the traditional appearance-reality task and
provided children with a non-verbal outlet to express their understanding of the true
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functions/identities of deceptive objects, a task designed by Saap et al. (2000) provided
an action-oriented means by which children could express their understanding of both
the appearance and reality ot such objects. In this task, 3-year-olds in one group were
familiarized with a crayon that looked like a candle while those in a second group were
familiarized with a rock that looked like a sponge. In addition to these deceptive
objects, the children in each group also were familiarized with an additional four, non-
deceptive objects (e.g. a ball, apple, cup, etc.). In each case, familiarization consisted
of having both the experimenter and the children label the appearances of each object
and demonstrate its true function.
Following familiarization, children were presented with the same five objects in
two different scenarios, one that required them to select the deceptive object based on
its appearance and one that required them to select it based on its function/true identity.
For instance, in the appearance scenario created for children in the crayon/candle
group, children were told that the experimenter wanted to take a picture of a nearby
teddy bear holding an object that looked like a crayon. These children were asked to
pick out one of the five objects that would help the experimenter do this. The children
in the rock/sponge group, on the other hand, were presented with the same appearance
scenario but were told that the experimenter wanted to take a picture of the teddy bear
holding something that looked like a rock. In the reality scenario, children in the
crayon/candle group were told that it was a nearby doll s birthday. The experimenter
then explained that in order to celebrate the doll’s birthday, s/he needed a candle to put
on the doll’s birthday cake. Children in this group then were asked to pick out one of
the five objects that could be used for this purpose. In the rock/sponge group, children
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watched as the experimenter spilled some water. They then were asked to pick
something out from among the five objects that could be used to clean up the spill.
Of the 15 children tested in each of the two groups just described, 14 selected
the candle/crayon and 15 selected the rock/sponge during each ol the two scenarios
presented; only 6 and 7 of the same children provided the correct verbal answers to the
two traditional questions posed regarding the candle/crayon and rock/sponge,
respectively. Furthermore, in their replication of this study, Saap et al. (2000) found
that children continued to select the deceptive objects even when one of the remaining
four non-deceptive objects also could have been used. For example, they continued to
select the rock/sponge in order to clean the spilled water even when a piece of tissue
paper was available. Based on these results, Saap et al. argued that the children’s
selections of the deceptive object in each of the appearance and reality scenarios
suggested that they both recognized the appearance of that object as well as its true
identity.
The results obtained by Saap et al. (2000) provide additional evidence that the
demand for children to respond to the traditional appearance reality questions may
mask their true understanding of the appearance-reality distinction. There have been
relatively few attempts, however, to extend these results to situations in which the
properties of objects, and not their identities, are the primary focus. In one of these
attempts, Saap et al. focused on the property of containment using a deceptive cup that
looked full even though it was empty. Again, 3-year-olds were presented with both
appearance and reality scenarios after being familiarized with this deceptive cup.
In
the appearance scenario, children were presented with both the deceptive
cup and an
33
empty cup and were told that the experimenter wanted to take a picture of a teddy bear
with a cup that looked full. They then were asked to select the correct cup. In one of
two reality scenarios, on the other hand, children were presented with both a cup full of
water and the deceptive cup. They then were told that the experimenter wanted to
drink some juice and were asked to hand her a cup into which she could pour the juice.
It was reasoned that if children selected the deceptive cup, then they must have
understood that even though the cup looked full, it really was empty and that
consequently, juice could be poured into it. In the second reality scenario, children
were told that the experimenter needed to water a plant. They then were asked to hand
the experimenter the cup that s/he could use to water the plant. In this case, the
selection of the cup that actually contained water was taken as evidence that even
though the deceptive cup looked full, children knew it was empty and could not be
used to water the plant.
When presented with the first and second reality scenarios referred to above, all
10 of the 3-year-olds tested selected the appropriate, deceptive cup and 9 of the same
10 children selected the appropriate, non-deceptive, full cup, respectively. All 10 of
the children also responded correctly to the appearance scenario described. In
comparison, only 1 out of the same 10 children answered the traditional appearance-
reality test questions about the deceptive cup correctly, with the majority making
phenomenism errors. Although Saap et al. (2000) took this as confirming evidence that
their scenarios and findings extended to object properties in general, containment is
only one of many different object properties that exist. As a result, the ability for
children to distinguish between the apparent and real properties ol objects such as size,
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color, and shape should not be assumed based on the containment evidence of Saap et
al. alone. Furthermore, these conclusions are based on children’s responses to only one
trial. In light of the vast number of traditional appearance-reality studies that have
found 3-year-olds lacking in their understanding of the appearance-reality distinction
with regard to both object properties and identities, one should be cautious in accepting
any claims that children do understand this distinction on the basis of their performance
on just one trial. Again, one must ask, how robust is this phenomenon?
In a second attempt to extend the findings of Saap et al. (2000) to a situation in
which the properties of objects were the primary focus, McCarty, Sylvia and Clifton
(2002) presented infants with a reaching-based assessment of the appearance-reality
distinction. In this study, 12, 18, and 24-month-old infants were repeatedly presented
with several large objects in the light and in the dark. The center of each object was
either embedded with a small, glow-in-the-dark object or partially painted with glow-
in-the-dark paint. Whereas the entire object was visible in the light, only the glowing
portion of each object was visible in the dark. This resulted in a size illusion whereby
the object appeared to be large in the light but small in the dark. At the same time, the
large size of each object required infants to reach for its perimeter in both the light and
the dark in order to retrieve it successfully. As a result, infants had to ignore the
visible, glow-in-the-dark portion of the object in the dark and reach toward its invisible
perimeter based on their representation, or memory, ol its true size in the light in order
to retrieve it.
In examining infants' reaches for the large objects in the light and in the dark,
McCarty et al. found that by 18 months of age, infants reached for the perimeter of the
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objects in both the light and the dark. Moreover, there was evidence of learning in this
task among the 18 and 24 month olds. Specifically, these infants were more likely to
reach to the perimeter of each object in the dark during the second half of the session
than during the first half ol the session. According to McCarty et al., it appeared as if
the feedback that the infants received from unsuccessfully grasping the glowing-in-the-
dark portions of the objects in the dark, or from successfully grasping the perimeter of
the objects in the light, may have been useful on subsequent trials. Taken together,
these results suggest that children even younger than 3 years of age can learn to
distinguish between the apparent and true size of a deceptive object in an action-
oriented task.
As with the results of Taylor and Hort (1990), Gauvain and Greene (1994), and
Saap et al. (2000), those of McCarty et al. (2002) suggest that the traditional, verbal-
based appearance-reality task may underestimate the general cognitive abilities of
young children. Unfortunately, however, McCarty et al. did not include a verbal test of
their appearance-reality illusion. As a result, is it unclear whether the glow-in-the-
dark size illusion created by McCarty et al. is comparable to the illusions created by the
property-distorting devices typically used in previous traditional appearance-reality
studies. In other words, it is possible that children who are asked the traditional
appearance-reality questions may respond differently when presented with glow-in-the-
dark illusions than when presented with the standard size illusions employed in
traditional studies. If this were the case, then the results obtained by McCarty et al.
would not necessarily be due to young children's abilities to distinguish between
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appearances and reality, but rather, the unique type of stimuli and/or illusions used in
this task.
Dual Representation
As the number of studies included in the previous section suggests, the
language demands of the traditional appearance-reality task have received much
attention with regard to the efforts made to understand young children’s difficulties
with this task. The belief that young children also must hold dual representations of
the same object in order to succeed in the traditional task, however, must not be
forgotten. As pointed out in the section on task demands, the same object must be
thought of in terms of how it both currently looks/is known to be and how it
looked/was thought to be prior to being transformed in the traditional appearance-
reality task; both of these representations must be available simultaneously in order to
answer the traditional test questions correctly. The ability to reason about such
representations, therefore, can not be ruled out as a potential problem for young
children in the traditional task.
In the developmental psychology literature, the concept of dual representation
often is used to refer to children’s use of symbols. In this area, the concept of dual
representation often has centered on the understanding that children who are presented
with, for instance, a toy model of an actual room, must mentally represent that model
both as a real, concrete object in and of itself and as an abstract symbol tor a real room.
In this case, a toy chair located in the model must be recognized both as a toy in and ot
itself while simultaneously standing for, or representing, a separate, real piece of
furniture. In the instance of a model room, children are able to hold and reason
about
37
dual representations as they pertain to such symbolism by the age of three (DeLoache,
1995).
Based on evidence that 3-year-olds can reason about model room situations in
which dual representation is inherent, some researchers have assumed that the dual
representation demands placed on children in the traditional appearance-reality task
should not be problematic. Yet it should be noted that the two representations involved
in model room tasks similar to the example just provided do not stand in conflict: the
toy chair and the actual furniture can be used for some of the same things (e.g. for a
doll to sit on, for a doll to hide under, as a landmark, etc.). In instances when the
physical similarity between the symbol and its referent decreases, however, even the
performance of 3-year-olds in model room situations declines (DeLoache, Kolstad, &
Anderson, 1991). In the traditional appearance-reality task, on the other hand, it is
clear from the start that appearance does not in any way correspond to reality at the
time that the crucial test questions are asked. As a matter of fact, the appearance of the
object often is in direct conflict with its reality, thus increasing the difficulty of the
appearance-reality task relative to model room situations. In this light, it is possible
that the demand of reasoning about two different representations that are placed in
conflict may lie at the heart of young children's problems with the traditional
appearance-reality task.
Conveniently, many of the studies that have focused on the language demands
of the appearance-reality task also speak to the suggestion that reasoning about
conflicting dual representations provides an obstacle for young children in the
traditional task. One such study described in the previous section is that by Saap,
et al.
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(2000). As mentioned, 3-year-olds in that study successfully selected the same
deceptive object in response to requests made in two different scenarios, one that
required them to select the deceptive object based on its appearance and one that
required them to select it based on its function/true identity. According to Saap et al.,
children s use of the same deceptive object in both scenarios suggests that they were
able to reason about the dual representations of the object's conflicting identities,
acknowledging its appearance when selecting it in the appearance scenario and its true
function/identity when selecting it in the reality scenario. As a result, they maintain
that children at this age can reason about conflicting dual representations and that this
aspect of the traditional appearance-reality task should not be viewed as an obstacle to
children’s success.
The study by Gauvain and Greene (1994) described in the previous section also
speaks to young children’s abilities to deal with conflicting dual representations. As
pointed out, 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old children who were unable to verbally distinguish
appearance from reality with regard to deceptive objects were able to demonstrate the
true functions/identities of these objects in a demonstration task. Based on these
results, Gauvain and Greene argue that the mere fact that these children could
demonstrate the true functions of objects that had deceptive appearances suggests that
they possessed some conceptual understanding of the objects’ identities and
consequently were capable of dealing at least at some level with two conflicting
representations. In this case, the conflicting representations would be those involving
the appearances of the deceptive objects and those involving their true identities.
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Although the arguments made by Saap et al. (2000) and Gauvain and Greene
(1994) appear reasonable, neither study directly tested the hypothesis that maintaining
and reasoning about dual representations may be a key stumbling block for children in
the traditional task. Flavell, Green, et al. (1987), on the other hand, provided a direct
test of this hypothesis in one condition of their study. In a “semantically transparent”
condition, 3-year-olds were shown a paper cutout of a flower that was placed behind a
colored filter, making it appear a different color than it was in reality. A piece of the
cutout was removed from behind the filter and children were presented with two
different pieces, one that matched the color that the flower appeared to be through the
filter and one that matched its true, original color. The children then were asked to
point out which of the two pieces appeared to be the same color that the flower
appeared to be through the filter and then point out the piece that really and truly was
the piece that came from the flower.
By asking the above questions, Flavell, Green, et al. (1987) created a situation
in which children no longer had to assign conflicting representations to the same
object. Because there were two pieces from which to choose, children could assign one
representation to one piece and a second to the remaining piece. By indicating that one
piece matched the current color of the flower as it appeared through the tiltei and that
the remaining piece matched its original color, the children in this condition no longer
had to view the object behind the filter as being two ditlerent colors at the same time,
they simply had to remember its color before it was placed behind the filter. Despite
this reduced need to reason about dual representations, only 10 of the
24 children tested
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responded to these questions correctly, with the majority of errors being ones of
phenomenism.
Based on the results obtained by Flavell, Green, et al. (1987), it again appears
as if the ability to reason about dual representations is not the primary explanation for
the failure of young children on the traditional appearance-reality test. As with the
other conditions of this study, however, a major problem lies in the fact that such
conclusions were drawn from the response of children on only one trial. Moreover,
since there have been so few investigations into the dual representation aspects of this
task, eliminating the possibility that this aspect of the traditional appearance-reality
task may be a problem for children seems premature. Again, further investigation in
this area must be done.
The Current Study
As the discussion thus far suggests, several efforts have been made to uncover
the source of the problems that young children have in the traditional appearance-
reality task. The result has been an array of alternative tasks in which single,
potentially problematic areas have been investigated using very different stimuli and
procedures. This situation has limited greatly our ability to compare results across
studies in order to determine which area is most problematic and consequently, holds
the key to understanding the problems that 3-year-olds face in the traditional task.
Moreover, many of these studies have used large age-ranges and have made sweeping
generalization often based on the responses made on only one trial of a given task. As
a result, many of the questions that these studies have set out to answer remain and the
reliability of their findings has yet to be determined.
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As mentioned, one potentially problematic area for children in the traditional
appearance-reality task is their lack of familiarity with the illusions and property-
distorting devices used (e.g. colored filters, magnifying/minifying lenses, etc.). As the
review of the traditional appearance-reality task presented here illustrates, it is clear
that children typically have been given little opportunity to become familiar with such
illusions and property-distorting devices. Because of this, the following question
remains: Does a lack of familiarity with the property-distorting devices used in the
traditional appearance-reality task interfere with 3-year-olds’ understanding of the
appearance-reality distinction? The current two experiments were designed to examine
this issue.
In addition to children's lack of familiarity with the materials used, the fact that
the traditional task is verbal-based also may present a challenge to uncovering 3 -year-
olds' level of understanding regarding the appearance-reality distinction. This challenge
is two-fold: children must not only understand the actual phrases used to describe the
distinction, but they also must be able, willing, and motivated to verbalize both their
current perceptions and memories of the original properties of the objects in the face of
repeated questioning by the experimenter. While several studies have attempted to
address these issues (e.g. Flavell, Flavell, et al., 1987; Gauvain & Greene, 1994;
Krause & Saamio, 1983; Saap et al., 2000; Taylor & Hort, 1990), their results have yet
to provide clear, generalizable insight into the effects of language on 3-year-olds'
understanding of this distinction. As a result, several questions regarding language
remain: Is young children's ability to make this distinction masked by the language
demands of the traditional task? Moreover, are young children able to express their
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understanding of this distinction in an action-oriented but not a verbal-based task?
Again, the current two experiments attempted to answer just these questions.
Finally, children's abilities to reason about conflicting dual representations
present yet a third potentially problematic area for children in the traditional
appearance-reality task. To date, few studies have isolated this factor and examined its
relation to 3-year-olds' performance on the traditional task. Does their ability to reason
about conflicting dual representations inhibit their performance in the traditional task?
The final goal of the current two experiments was to examine the role that this factor
plays in 3-year-olds' abilities to make the appearance-reality distinction.
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CHAPTER 2
EXPERIMENT 1
Design and Predictions
In Experiment 1, 3-year-olds' familiarity with a property-distorting device
typically used in traditional appearance-reality tasks, their ability to make the
appearance-reality distinction in an action-oriented rather than a verbal-based task, and
their ability to reason about dual representations was examined using objects that have
conflicting sizes. The focus of the first portion centered on the notion that the primary
problem faced by children in traditional appearance-reality tasks is their lack of
familiarity with the property-distorting devices used. It therefore was assumed that
children could become familiar with novel devices through hands-on training.
Consequently, there were two groups of children differing only in the availability of
hands-on training with the property-distorting device used.
Because of its use in several traditional appearance-reality studies to date (e.g.
Taylor & Flavell, 1984; Flavell et al., 1983), the property-distorting device used in the
current experiment was a minifying lens, that is, a lens that makes things appear
smaller than they truly are. Three-year-olds in the training group underwent extensive,
hands-on training using this lens in order to alter the appearance of several objects.
Following this, they were presented with four, large wooden cutouts of different
shapes. While viewing each shape through the lens, these children were asked the
traditional appearance-reality questions (i.e. "To your eyes right now, does it look like
a big (label of the shape) or a little (label of the shape)?" and "Really and truly, is
it a
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big (label of the shape) or a little (label of the shape)?"). Children in the control group,
on the other hand, did not receive any hands-on training with the minifying lens. They
simply viewed each of the shapes through the lens and were asked the same traditional
appearance-reality questions. It was hypothesized that if 3-year-olds' familiarity with
the property-distorting device used is key to their ability to verbally distinguish
appearance from reality, then the children in the training group would answer the
appearance-reality questions correctly while those in the control group would commit
phenomenism errors.
In addition to the familiarity hypothesis, the action and dual representation
hypotheses also were examined in Experiment 1 . Children in each of the two groups
described thus far were asked to complete three different tasks: a standard verbal task,
an action task, and a separated verbal task. The standard verbal task was identical to
the traditional task used by Flavell and colleagues (e.g. Flavell et al., 1986) and
involved asking children the traditional appearance-reality questions. This situation
required children to verbally assign conflicting sizes (i.e. large and small) to each of
four shapes as they were viewed through the minifying lens. In contrast, children were
presented with four puzzles that each had one missing piece in both the action and
separated verbal tasks. For each puzzle, they were shown two potential pieces, one that
was too large and one that was a perfect fit for the puzzle. The minifying lens then was
placed in front of both pieces simultaneously, with the end result being one piece that
looked just right through the lens but was too large to fit the puzzle in reality and a
second piece that looked too small but actually was just right (see Method section for
illustration).
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In the action task, children were asked to indicate which piece would fit the
target puzzle and then were given the opportunity to complete the puzzle using that
piece. It was reasoned that asking children to select one of two available pieces in
order to complete the puzzle in the action task would have two benefits. First, it
eliminated the potential confusion present in the language of the traditional test
questions, children simply were asked which piece should be used to complete the
puzzle. Moreover, asking children to perform an action in which making the
appearance-reality distinction was necessary for success should have motivated them to
carefully reason about the distinction because there was now a direct, observable
consequence for their selections (i.e. a selected piece either would or would not fit).
Consequently, it was hypothesized that if children can demonstrate their knowledge of
the appearance-reality distinction in an action-oriented but not verbal-based task, then
the 3 -year-olds in this experiment should override the apparent sizes of the available
pieces viewed through the minifying lens with their knowledge regarding the true sizes
of those pieces in order to complete each puzzle successfully. Moreover, an interaction
in which only the children in the training group, and not the control group, would
complete the puzzles successfully was predicted if familiarity with the property-
distorting device used is a factor.
In contrast to the action task, children were asked two verbal questions similar
to those used in the traditional task (i.e. "To your eyes right now, which piece looks
like it will fit the puzzle?" and "Really and truly, which piece will fit the puzzle?") in
the separated verbal task. This task created a situation analogous to that of Flavell,
Green, et al. (1987), as described in the dual representation section of Chapter 1. In
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this task, children no longer had to assign two conflicting representations to the same
puzzle piece by verbally labeling that piece as one that both looked like it would fit but
at the same time was too large to fit the puzzle. Instead, they could assign one of the
conflicting representations to one of the two available pieces and the remaining
representation to a completely different piece. Essentially, they could reason that one
piece really would fit the puzzle while the remaining piece only looked like it would fit
the puzzle without ever having to acknowledge verbally that a single piece both looked
like it would fit but really and truly was too large or looked too small to fit but really
and truly was just right. It was hypothesized that if the ability to reason about
conflicting dual representations is a problem for 3-year-olds in the traditional
appearance-reality task, then children would answers both of the questions in this task
correctly. As with the action task, it also was hypothesized that if familiarity with the
minifying lens was a factor, only the children in the training group, and not the control
group, would be able to solve the puzzles.
In addition to providing a single situation in which the three hypotheses just
mentioned could be tested, the design of the current experiment provided the unique
opportunity to observe the effects that mastering one of the three potentially
problematic areas might have on the remaining two. When examining 3-year-olds'
understanding of the appearance-reality distinction as it applies to object identities,
Gauvain & Greene (1994) found that the order of presentation of a traditional verbal
and an action-oriented demonstration task had no effect on children's performances in
either condition. In this case, children typically failed the verbal task and performed
significantly better on the action-oriented task regardless of the task first completed.
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At the same time, however, Saap et al. (2000) found that participation in a traditional,
verbal-based appearance-reality task negatively affected subsequent performance in an
action-oriented task. Surprisingly, however, participation in an action-oriented task
first had no effect on subsequent verbal task performance; children continued to fail the
traditional verbal-based task even when they were able to demonstrate their
understanding of the appearance-reality distinction using their actions. The design of
the current experiment allowed these conflicting findings to be investigated further
with regard to object properties.
Would observing the direct consequences obtained in the action task help
children to reason about the appearance-reality distinction to the point that they then
would be able to answer the verbal questions regarding this distinction correctly? Or
would their participation in the traditional, standard verbal task hurt their subsequent
performance in the action task? Moreover, would their level of familiarity with the
property-distorting device used affect their performance in only the action or the verbal
tasks? The design of the current experiment allowed for additional insight into
questions such as these through an examination of the interactions between groups
and/or tasks.
Finally, the design of the current experiment also provided the opportunity to
examine performance over multiple trials of each of the three different types of tasks
(i.e. standard verbal, action, and separated verbal). As mentioned previously, several
of the appearance-reality studies that have investigated the role of language and dual
representation in young children's abilities to make this distinction have included only
one trial of a given appearance-reality task (e.g. Flavell, Green, et al., 1987, Saap
et al.,
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2000, etc.). As a result, it is difficult to tell whether children's success and/or failure in
these studies is representative of their true knowledge regarding this distinction.
Moreover, the presentation of only one trial makes it impossible to examine whether
young children can learn to make this distinction over the course of several trials. Any
indication of learning should shed light on the limitations of children's reasoning
abilities in similar situations.
Can 3-year-olds learn to distinguish appearances from reality over the course of
several trials in a given appearance-reality task or are they simply unable to reason
about the distinction at all? Moreover, is the potential for learning about this
distinction constrained to certain types of situations (i.e. verbal versus action-oriented
tasks)? The presentation of multiple trials in each of the three tasks in the current
experiment allowed for investigation into just these questions.
Method
Participants
A total of 66 participants were recruited from Massachusetts' state birth records
with an explanatory letter followed by a telephone call. The data from 1 8 ot these
children were eliminated due to failure to complete all three tasks (n—8), failure to look
through the lens during questioning (n=4), failure to reach criteria during puzzle
familiarization (n=3), experimenter error (n=2), and equipment failure (n=l). Each of
the remaining 48 participants was randomly assigned to either the control or
training
group until there was a total of 24 participants in each group (with 8
participants in
each of 3 different orders of task presentation). Within each
group, 14 children (8
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male, 6 female) were tested at the University of Massachusetts Amherst while the
remaining 10 children (4 male, 6 female) were tested at the Child Study Center in
Springfield, Massachusetts. Together, these participants ranged in age from 2 years, 1
1
months, and 28 days to 3 years, 1 month, and 4 days, with a mean age of 3 years, 2
weeks, and 2 days (SD= 10.65 days).
Materials
A total of twelve, one piece puzzles measuring approximately 20.5 by 25.5 cm
were used in the current experiment. A picture of a familiar animal or object was
painted on each puzzle with fluorescent, glow-in-the-dark paint. A monochromatic
piece measuring approximately 5 by 5 cm was cut from the center of each puzzle and
constituted the puzzle’s missing piece (see Appendix for a complete list of the puzzles
and their missing pieces). Together, the 12 missing pieces consisted of triangles,
hearts, squares, and circles, making them easy for both the experimenter and child to
label.
In addition to the pieces just described, additional pieces that did not fit the
puzzles also were used. Although identical to each of the missing pieces in shape and
color, these pieces were either too small or too large to fit the missing spaces of the
puzzles. For each of the four shapes (i.e. triangle, heart, square, and circle), there were
four additional shapes that were approximately half the size of the actual missing
pieces (i.e. 2.5 by 2.5 cm) and four that were twice their size (i.e. 10 by 10 cm) (see
Figure 1 for example). Three additional wooden cutouts measuring approximately 9.5
by 9.5 cm also were used during the device familiarization portion of the
testing
session for children in the training group only. These shapes included a
blue star, an
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orange hand, and a green shamrock. All of the shapes and pieces mentioned had a
small button ol Velcro attached to their backsides so that they could be attached easily
to a white, 74.5 by 55.5 cm foamboard background for presentation purposes.
Figure 1 . Example of puzzle, its appropriate missing piece (middle), a piece that is
twice the size of the appropriate piece (top), and one that is half its size (bottom).
The property-distorting device used was a 20.5 x 25.5 cm Vangard lens
attached to a Plexiglas frame (referred to from here on as a “minifying lens”). When
viewed through the lens, objects located approximately 30-40 cm behind the lens
appeared to be half their size. As a result, a piece that was too large to fit the missing
space of a target puzzle appeared to be the appropriate size when viewed through the
lens whereas a piece that truly was appropriate appeared to be too small to fill the
missing space (see Figure 3 in Procedure section for illustration). The lens was used
during both the device familiarization and testing portion of each session for children
in the training group and during the testing session only for children in the control
group.
Finally, a hand puppet named "Spot the Dog", along with a puppet-sized ghost
costume, was used during the term familiarization portion of the session. Each testing
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session was recorded by a video-camera aimed over the child's shoulder, providing a
view of the materials and selections of each child.
Procedure
C hildren in each group sat at a table in front of and approximately 36 cm away
from an upright piece of white toamboard that provided the background stage for the
session. In both groups, children participated in a period of puzzle and term
familiarization. For children in the training group only, these familiarization phases
were followed by a period of device familiarization. For children in the control group,
on the other hand, these two familiarization periods were followed by a brief filler task,
equal in length to the device familiarization of the training group. In both groups, these
three phases were followed by three different test tasks presented in one of three
different orders of presentation during the testing session (see Table 1 for illustration).
Table 1. Presentation of Events in Experiment 1
Training Group
n=24
Control Group
n=24
1. Puzzle Familiarization 1. Puzzle Familiarization
2. Term Familiarization 2. Term Familiarization
3. Device Familiarization 3. Filler Task
4. Testing Session 4. Testing Session
- Standard Verbal Task - Standard Verbal Task
- Action Task - Action Task
- Separated Verbal Task - Separated Verbal Task
Puzzle Familiarization
The purpose of this period of familiarization was to ensure that children in both groups
were able to complete a simple, one piece puzzle on the lirst try when asked to select
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between a piece that was the correct size and one that was too small (see Figure 2 for
example). This was especially important because choosing between a piece that
appeared too small and one that appeared just right was essentially the same type of
decision that children would have to make during the action task trials.
Figure 2. Example of puzzle presented during puzzle familiarization period, with
appropriate missing piece (top) and piece that is half its size (bottom).
During puzzle familiarization, the experimenter presented each child with a
single puzzle and pointed out its missing piece. The puzzle was placed upright on a
stand to the child's right as two potential pieces were Velcroed, one above the other, to
the upright piece of foamboard that served as the background stage. The child then
was asked to indicate which piece, the "top" or "bottom" one, should be used. Both
verbal and pointing gestures were accepted as an indication of the piece that the child
wished to use. Once identified, the experimenter retrieved the piece indicated by the
child and handed it to him/her in order for the child to complete the puzzle. If the child
selected the incorrect piece, the experimenter pointed out the error and the child was
allowed to use the remaining piece to complete the puzzle successfully. A new puzzle
then was introduced and the procedure was repeated until the child successfully
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completed a total of two puzzles or until all 4 of the puzzles set aside for
familiarization had been presented (see Appendix for a list of the puzzles). If the child
failed to complete at least two of these four puzzles correctly on the first try. the
session continued but the data obtained were eliminated from the analyses.
Term Familiarization
Following puzzle familiarization, children in both groups were introduced to a
hand puppet named Spot the Dog. Following the term familiarization protocol of
Flavell, Green, and Flavell (1986), the puppet was covered with a ghost costume and
the experimenter explained, "When you look at this with your eyes right now, it looks
like a ghost." The experimenter continued, "It looks like a ghost to your eyes right
now, but really and truly it's not a ghost. Really and truly, it's Spot the Dog." At this
point, the experimenter removed the costume and explained, "That's because
sometimes things can look one way to our eyes but they are really and truly something
else." Following this, the puppet and the costume were put away and the session
continued.
Device Familiarization
Children in only the training group took part in a period of device
familiarization following the term familiarization just described. The purpose oi this
period was to give children hands-on experience with the property-distorting device.
During this time, the minifying lens was introduced as something that made objects
viewed through it appear small. The experimenter then placed a wooden cutout ol a
blue star against the white foamboard background and placed the lens
approximately
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35 cm in front of the star, asking the child to look at the star through the lens. During
this time, the experimenter pointed out that the star looked much smaller through the
lens than it did previously. The lens then was removed and replaced one additional
time by the experimenter before the child was told that it was his/her turn to try. At
this point, the star was removed and a second, orange wooden cutout of a hand was
introduced. This time, however, the child was asked to place the cutout against the
background and hold the lens in front of it him/herself in order to view the cutout
through the lens. Again, the experimenter commented on the small appearance of the
cutout through the lens. At this point, the child was invited to look around and/or
above the lens in order to view the object without the lens. After viewing a third cutout
of a green shamrock in the same manner, the experimenter placed her hand behind the
lens and the child was asked to do the same. It was reasoned that if viewing cutouts of
shapes through the lens and then peeking around/above it did not convey that these
shapes truly did not "shrink" when the lens was placed in front of them, then placing
one's hand behind the lens should have accomplished this goal. In this case, the child
received proprioceptive feedback indicating that his/her hand had not changed size
when it was placed behind the lens. Again, the experimenter continued to comment on
the small size of her and the child's hands as they were viewed through the lens.
Filler Task
In order to keep the length of the session equivalent for children in both groups,
children in the control group participated in a filler task during the time that children in
the training group participated in the device familiarization period. During this time,
these children were presented with five different markers and were asked to help the
55
experimenter play "the line game" in order to ensure that each marker worked. During
the line game, the experimenter and the child took turns drawing lines on a blank piece
of paper with each of the markers.
Test Tasks
Following each of the familiarization periods just described, children in each
group proceeded to the testing portion of the session. During this time, they were
presented with three different tasks in order to examine the familiarity, action, and dual
representation hypotheses. Because it was unclear whether the completion of certain
tasks would affect performance on subsequent tasks, the order in which the tasks were
presented varied. One-third of the children in each group were assigned randomly to
begin with the standard verbal task, followed by the action task, and ending with the
separated verbal task (order 1), while one-third began with the action task first,
followed by the separated verbal and then standard verbal tasks (order 2). The
remaining one-third of the children in each group began with the separated verbal task
first, followed by the standard verbal and action tasks, respectively (order 3). There
were an equal number of males and females assigned to each order ol presentation.
The Standard Verbal Task
The standard verbal task followed the same procedure ol the traditional
appearance-reality task designed by Flavell and colleagues (e.g. Flavell, Green, &
Flavell, 1986). During this task, children in the training and control groups were
presented with four trials each. During an individual trial, a single, wooden cutout of a
shape (i.e. a triangle, heart, square or circle) was attached to the foamboard
background
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and the minifying lens was placed approximately 35 cm in front of it. Through the
lens, this shape appeared to be half of its 5 by 5 cm original size. As the child viewed
the shape through the lens, s/he was asked the two traditional appearance-reality
questions, that is, I o your eyes right now, does it look like a big (label of shape) or a
little (label of shape)?” and “Really and truly, is it a big (label of shape) or a little (label
of shape)?”. Children were not given any feedback regarding the correctness or
incorrectness of their answers. Moreover, the experimenter ensured that each child was
centered behind and looking through the lens at the time that each question was asked
and answered. Following the standard protocol used by Flavell and colleagues (see
Flavell et al, 1986), the order of the appearance and reality questions was fixed for each
trial as follows: reality question first (trial 1), appearance question first (trial 2), reality
question first (trial 3), and appearance question first (trial 4). The size mentioned first
in each question (i.e. "big" or "little") was randomized for each child over the four
trials. See Appendix for the order in which the four shapes used were presented.
The Action Task
In contrast to the standard verbal task, each child was asked to complete a series
of puzzles instead of answering a series of verbal questions during the action task
portion of the testing session. Again, children in each group were presented with a
total of four trials during this task. During an individual trial, each child was presented
with a puzzle that was placed upright on a stand to his/her right. 1 wo pieces, one that
was too large and one that fit the puzzle, were placed against the foamboard
background, one above the other. For each child in the control and training groups,
the
minifying lens was placed approximately 35 cm in front ol both pieces only
(i.e. not in
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front of the puzzle itself) and the child was asked to indicate which one (i.c. the "top or
bottom" one) should be used to complete the puzzle. Through the lens, each piece
appeared to be half its true size, therefore, the correct piece looked too small to fit the
puzzle and the piece that was too large appeared just right (see Figure 3 for
illustration). Again, the experimenter ensured that each child was centered behind and
looking through the lens at the time that each selection was made. Once a selection
was made, the experimenter retrieved the piece that was indicated from behind the lens
and handed it to the child in order for him/her to complete the puzzle.
r*f n, 17.7.1e and size of pieces as they appeared in their original state
I
when both pieces were viewed through the lens.
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If a child selected the incorrect piece during the action task, the immediate
consequence was clear: the piece that s/he selected did not fit the missing space of the
puzzle. When this occurred, the experimenter commented on this fact and re-
emphasized the notion that the selected piece only looked as if it would fit the puzzle
through the lens, but really and truly, was too big. The child then was allowed to
complete the puzzle using the remaining piece. The position of the correct piece (i.e.
top or bottom) during each trial was alternated over the four trials, starting in the top
position. As in the standard task, the location mentioned first in the question was
randomized for each child over the four trials. See Appendix for the order in which
each of the four puzzles set aside for this task was presented.
The Separated Verbal Task
The purpose of the separated verbal task was to examine the dual representation
hypothesis. Again, children in each group were presented with four trials in this task.
During each trial, a puzzle was introduced and placed upright on a stand to the child’s
right. As in the action task, two pieces (i.e. one that was too large and one that was just
right to complete the puzzle) were placed against the foamboard background and the
minifying lens was placed approximately 35 cm in front of them. Each child then was
asked a series of two questions similar to the traditional appearance-reality questions,
that is, “Really and truly, which piece will fit the puzzle, the top one or the bottom
one?” and “To your eyes right now, which piece looks like it will fit the puzzle, the top
one or the bottom one?”. As in the standard verbal task, children were not given any
feedback regarding the correctness or incorrectness of their answers. In order to keep
the children interested in the task, however, they were allowed to complete the puzzle
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once the questions were asked and answered, but only after the experimenter had
removed the lens from in front of the available pieces. Again, the order in which these
questions were asked, as well as the actual location of the piece that truly fit the puzzle,
were fixed as follows: reality question first with the piece that fit on top (trial 1 ),
appearance question first with the piece that fit on the bottom (trial 2), reality question
first with the piece that fit on the top (trial 3), and appearance question first with the
piece that fit on the bottom (trial 4). The order of the location of the piece mentioned
first in each question was randomized over the four trials for each participant. The
order in which each of the four puzzles set aside for this task was presented can be
found in the Appendix.
As the above description suggests, the major difference between the standard
verbal task and the separated verbal task involved the availability of only one piece in
the first task versus the availability of two pieces in the latter task. While children had
to assign conflicting labels (i.e. “big” and “little”) to the same piece in order to answer
the traditional appearance-reality questions of the standard verbal task correctly, they
could select one piece in response to the appearance question and a completely
different piece in response to the reality question of the current task. As a result, the
separated verbal task circumvented the need to assign two different representations to a
single piece.
Scoring of the Data
Videotapes of the testing sessions were coded by two independent observers,
with a primary observer scoring all of the testing sessions and a secondary observer
scoring only half of the testing sessions for reliability. For the trials presented during
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the standard verbal task, observers recorded each child's first verbal response to the two
traditional appearance-reality questions. For each trial, these responses were coded as
either correct responses (i.e. a child indicated that the shape looked "little" but really
was big ), phenomenism errors (i.e. a child indicated that the shape looked "little" and
really was "little"), realism errors (i.e. a child indicated that the shape looked "big" and
really was "big"), or "inconsistent" errors (i.e. a child indicated that the shape looked
"big" but really was "little").
For each of the trials presented during the action task, the observers recorded
each child s indication ol the piece that s/he wished to use in order to complete the
puzzle. On a number of trials, children indicated their choices either by pointing to
their selections directly on the lens or by placing their hands around the side of and
behind the lens and then pointing to their selections (while continuing to view the
pieces through the lens) without ever verbally indicating the location of the piece that
they wished to use by saying "top" or "bottom". For these trials, the observers recorded
the first of these alternative, non-verbal responses. Furthermore, because this task was
designed to investigate the possibility that children may respond differently in an
action-oriented task than in a verbal-based task, only the non-verbal, action responses
of children who verbally indicated one piece while simultaneously pointing to the
opposite piece were recorded. It is important to note, however, that such occurrences
were extremely rare, with 3 children exhibiting this behavior on a total ot only 4 ol the
192 action task trials.
Finally, for each separated verbal trial, observers recorded each child's first
verbal response to the two traditional appearance-reality questions asked. As with the
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action task, however, children often responded to these questions by pointing to a given
piece without verbally responding to the question. On these trials, such alternative,
non-verbal means of responding were recorded by the observers. On several different
occasions, some children also responded by pointing to one location and verbally
identifying the opposite location. Again, these instances were rare, with 8 children
responding in this manner on a total of 1 1 of the 384 questions asked over the 192 trials
of this task.
It is important to note that in contrast to the action task, the separated verbal
task was aimed at testing children's responses to the traditional appearance-reality
questions in a situation that eliminated only the dual representation demand, and not
the verbal demands, of the traditional appearance-reality task. If the demand of
reasoning about dual representations truly was a significant challenge for young
children, then their verbal responses should have resulted in a significant improvement
in this task when compared to that of the standard verbal task, regardless of the
children's actions. Based on this line of reasoning, observers recorded only the verbal
responses to the 1 1 questions on which children pointed to one location but verbally
indicated the opposing location. As in the standard verbal task, all of the recorded
responses to the appearance and reality questions of each trial were coded as either
correct responses (i.e. a child correctly answered both questions), phenomenism errors
(i.e. a child selected the piece that looked like it would fit the puzzle but truly was too
large in response to both questions), realism errors (i.e. a child selected the piece that
truly would fit the puzzle but looked too small in response to both questions), or
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inconsistent errors (i.e. a child selected the wrong pieces in response to each of the two
questions).
Inter-Observer Reliability
The reliability between observers was computed as the number of agreements
divided by the total number of responses scored by both observers. Because scoring of
the data involved categorizing children's responses as either correct or incorrect,
Cohen's Kappa coefficient also was computed as a measure of inter-observer
agreement. Of the 480 responses coded by each observer, the primary and secondary-
observers agreed on a total of 474 responses, or 98.8% of the data (Cohen's
Kappa=0.98). Because the secondary observer scored only 50% of the data, only the
judgments of the primary observer were used in the subsequent analyses.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
In order to ensure that there were no age differences among the various groups,
a gender (male, female) x location of test (Amherst, Springfield) x group (training,
control) x order of presentation (orders 1, 2, 3) factorial Analysis ot Variance
(ANOVA) was conducted on children's age in days at the time of test. There was a
significant main effect of gender, with the males averaging 3 years, 2 weeks, and 6
days (SD=9.14 days) and the females averaging 3 years, 1 week, and 3 days (SD=10.16
days) at time of testing, a mean difference of 9.29 days, F (1,24)=8.31,
p=0.008. No
additional main effects or interactions were found.
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Preliminary analyses of the data also were conducted on the overall proportion
o( trials correct in order to determine whether there were any significant differences
involving gender or location of test (i.e. Springfield or Amherst). No significant main
effects or interactions involving these factors were revealed, therefore, the data were
collapsed across these dimensions tor all subsequent analyses. More importantly, the
tact that there were no main effects or interactions involving gender alleviated any
concern regarding the main effect for gender uncovered in the preceding preliminary
analysis on age.
Analyses of Correct Trials
As pointed out in Chapter 1 , 3-year-olds who are presented with a traditional,
verbal-based appearance-reality task centered on object properties typically make
phenomenism errors, claiming that a target object truly is as it misleadingly appears to
be (see Flavell et al., 1983; Flavell et ah, 1986; Flavelh Green, et ah, 1987; Saap et ah,
2000, etc.). It therefore was reasoned that if such findings accurately represent
children's inability to distinguish appearance from reality, then children in the current
experiment should have been captured by the misleading appearances of the shapes
and/or puzzle pieces when they were viewed through the minifying lens.
Consequently, these children should have performed poorly in each ot the three test
tasks presented, that is, there should have been no differences in performance among
the different tasks.
In order to examine the above possibility, as well as the familiarity, action, and
dual representation hypotheses, the proportion ol trials correct in each ot the thiec tasks
was calculated separately lor each child. A group (training, control) x order ot
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presentation (orders 1, 2, 3) x task (standard verbal, action, separated verbal) mixed-
design ANOVA then was conducted, with group and order as between-subjects factors
and task as a within-subjects factor. 1 he means for each of these conditions appear in
Table 2.
Table 2. Mean Proportion of Correct Responses on Each Task of Experiment 1
Order Standard Verbal
Task Action Task
Separated Verbal
Task
Training Group
Order 1 0.03 (SD=0.09) 0.72 (SD=0.31) 0.13 (SD=0.13)
Order 2 0.09 (SD=0.13) 0.38 (SD=0.33) 0.09 (SD=0.19)
Order 3 0.09 (SD=0.27) 0.38 (SD=0.44) 0.13 (SD=0.19)
Control Group
Order 1 0.06 (SD=0.18) 0.69 (SD=0.26) 0.09 (SD=0.13)
Order 2 0.19 (SD=0.22) 0.50 (SD=0.30) 0.19 (SD=0.18)
Order 3 0.06 (SD=0.12) 0.75 (SD=0.23) 0.09 (SD=0.19)
Note. Order l=standard verbal task, action task, separated verbal task, order 2=action
task, separated verbal task, standard verbal task, order 3=separated verbal task,
standard verbal task, action task.
According to the familiarization hypothesis, children in the training group (i.e.
those who received hands-on training with the minifying lens) should have performed
better than children in the control group (i.e. those who did not receive training). The
average proportion of trials correct on the standard verbal, action, and separated verbal
tasks, however, were 0.07 (SD=0.17), 0.48, (SD=0.39), and 0.1 1 (SD-0.16) for
children in the training group, and 0.10 (SD=. 18), 0.65 (SD=.28), and 0.16 (SD-.16)
for children in the control group, respectively. As these results suggest,
there was no
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significant main effect of group, nor were there any significant interactions involving
the group variable. Taken together, these results indicate that the presence of hands-on
training had little effect on performance in any of the three test tasks presented.
A second hypothesis tested in the current experiment was the action hypothesis,
which predicted that children would perform better in the action task (which eliminated
the need for verbal responses to the traditional appearance-reality questions) than in the
standard verbal and separated verbal tasks (both of which required verbal responses to
the traditional appearance-reality questions). The dual representation hypothesis, on
the other hand, predicted that performance would be better in the separated verbal task
(which eliminated the need to assign conflicting representations to a single object) than
in the action and standard verbal tasks. Figure 4 illustrates the mean proportion of
trials correct in each of the three tasks for each of the three orders of presentation
separately. As this figure suggests, there was a significant main effect of task,
F(2,84)=69.98, p<0.001, as well as a significant task by order of presentation
interaction, F(4,84)=2.99, p=0.02. There was, however, no significant main effect for
order of presentation, nor was there a third-order interaction between the task, group,
and order of presentation variables.
Because inspection of the data presented in Figure 4 suggested that the task by
order of presentation interaction most-likely was due to differences among the action
task scores of the three different orders of presentation, pairwise contrasts were
conducted on the mean action task performances in each order using the Bonferroni
adjusted t statistic for K=3 contrasts. The only significant difference was that between
the mean action task performances in orders 1 versus 2, with children in order 1
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answering a mean proportion of 0.70 trials correctly (SD=0.28) and those in order 2
answering a mean proportion of 0.44 trials correctly (SD=0.31 ). t(30)=2.56, £<0.05
The mean action task performance in order 3 (M=0.56, SD=0.39) was intermediate, hut
not significantly different Irom the mean action task performances in orders 1 or 2.
t(30)=1.17, g>0.05, t(30)=1.00, £>0.05, respectively.
1
0 9 Order 1
Standard Action Separated
Verbal Verbal
Task
Figure 4. Mean proportion of trials correct in Experiment 1 by task and order of
presentation (order l=standard verbal task, action task, separated verbal task, order
2=action task, separated verbal task, standard verbal task, order 3=separated verbal
task, standard verbal task, action task).
In order to investigate whether improved performance in the action task
occurred in each of the three orders of task presentation, pairwise contrasts were
performed between each task for each order of presentation separately using the
Bonferroni adjusted t statistic for K=9 contrasts. The results of these contrasts can be
found in Table 3. In short, the pattern of performance across the three tasks was the
same in each order of presentation, with children performing significantly better in the
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action task than in the standard verbal and separated verbal tasks, and with no
significant differences between the latter two tasks (see 1 able 3 for significance levels).
Table 3. Results ol Pairwise C ontrasts for Mean I ask Performances
of Experiment 1
Contrast df t E
Order 1
Standard Verbal v. Action Task 15 8.35 <0.01*
Standard Verbal v. Separated Verbal Task 15 1.46 >0.05
Action v. Separated Verbal Task 15 8.27 <0.01*
Order 2
Standard Verbal v. Action Task 15 5.22 <0.01*
Standard Verbal v. Separated Verbal Task 15 0.00 >0.05
Action v. Separated Verbal Task 15 3.34 <0.05*
Order 3
Standard Verbal v. Action Task 15 4.48 <0.01*
Standard Verbal v. Separated Verbal Task 15 0.42 >0.05
Action v. Separated Verbal Task 15 4.21 <0.01*
Note. Order l=standard verbal task, action task, separated verbal task, order 2=action
task, separated verbal task, standard verbal task, order 3=separated verbal task,
standard verbal task, action task.
Taken together, the above results clearly indicate that the performance patterns
obtained in the current experiment were not in line with the poor, across task
performance predicted by the results obtained in previous, traditional, verbal-based
appearance-reality studies (e.g. Flavell et al., 1983; Flavell et ah, 1986; Flavell, Green,
et ah, 1987; Saap et ah, 2000, etc.). Instead, performance in the current experiment
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varied as a result of the type of task presented, with children performing better in the
action task than in either the standard verbal and separated verbal tasks.
In order to examining these results further, it was important to consider the fact
that on any given action trial, there were two possible answers (i.e. children had to
choose between two available puzzle pieces). Consequently, each child had a 50%
chance of making the appropriate selection if s/he simply selected pieces at random.
Interestingly, the mean proportion of trials correct in the action task was only 0.57
trials (SD=0.34), which was not significantly different from chance, t(47)=l .38,
P=0. 18. Despite this fact, it is important to note that when the action task
performances were examined in each order of presentation separately, the action task
performance of children in order 1 was above chance (M=0.70, SD=0.28), with a 95%
confidence interval of 0.70 ±0.15 trials, t(15)=2.93, p<0.05. The performance of
children in orders 2 and 3, however, was not significantly different from chance
(M=0.44, SD= 0.31 and M=0.56, SD=0.39 for orders 2 and 3, respectively),
t( 1 5)—0.80, p>0.10 and t(15)=0.64, p>0.10, respectively. Taken together, these results
suggest that although children generally performed better in the action task than in the
standard and separated verbal tasks, only children in order 1 did so as the result of
consistently selecting the correct piece across the four trials of the action task.
Although children in orders 2 and 3 also performed better in the action than in the
verbal tasks, they did not appear to do so as the result of such consistently correct
selections, but rather, as the result of making random selections. Perhaps the more
important conclusion, however, is that children were not consistently biased by the
appearance of the array to the point that they regularly choose the incorrect alternative.
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In addition to the above investigation of action task performance, an
examination of standard verbal and separated verbal task performance also provided
further insight into the pattern of results obtained in the current experiment. In order to
do this, it was important to note that in both the standard and separated verbal tasks,
there were two questions per trial, each with two possible responses/selections (e.g.,
"big" or "little"). Consequently, there was a 25% chance of responding with the
appropriate answer to both questions on any given verbal trial. The observed mean
proportion of trials correct in the standard verbal task (M=0.09 trials, SD=0.17),
therefore, was significantly below chance, with a 95% confidence interval of 0.09 ±
0.05, t(47)=6.40, £<0.001. Likewise, the observed mean proportion of trials correct in
the separated verbal task (M=0.12 trials, SD=0.16) also was significantly below
chance, with a 95% confidence interval of 0.12 ± 0.5, t(47)=5.54, £<0.001. This
pattern of results held when each of the three orders of presentation were considered
separately. Taken together, these results suggest that children's poor performance in
the verbal tasks of the current experiment were the result of systemic error patterns.
Moreover, in light of the pattern of performance obtained in the action task, the
improved performance of children in the action versus verbal tasks of the current
experiment appears to have been the result of children performing significantly below
chance in each of the verbal tasks but not in the action task.
Two possible explanations may account for the below chance performance
obtained in both of the verbal tasks. Each explanation centers on the fact that in order
to respond correctly on any given trial of the standard verbal and separated verbal
tasks, a child had to provide different answers to the appearance and reality questions
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of that trial. For example, in the standard verbal task, s/he had to indicate that a single
shape both appeared small but truly was large in order to be correct (i.e. s/he had to
respond to the appearance question with "little" while responding to the reality question
with "big"). In the separated verbal task, on the other hand, the child had to indicate
that one of two available pieces appeared as if it would fit the puzzle while the
remaining piece truly would fit the puzzle in order to be correct.
In contrast to the above pattern of responses necessary for correct trial
performance, there were two types of response patterns that resulted in incorrect trial
performance, an inconsistent response pattern and a consistent response pattern. In the
first case, a child would have been incorrect by providing two different, but incorrect
answers, to the appearance and reality questions of a given trial. In the standard verbal
task, this would have occurred when a child indicated that a single shape appeared
"big" through the minifying lens but truly was "little". In the separated verbal task, on
the other hand, this would have occurred when a child selected the piece that appeared
too small but truly would have fit the puzzle in response to the appearance question and
then selected the piece that appeared to fit the puzzle but truly was too large in
response to the reality question. At the same time, however, it also was possible to be
incorrect on a standard or separated verbal trial by providing the same, consistent
answer to both the appearance and reality questions of that trial. This consistent
response pattern would have resulted in a phenomenism error if the answer was in
accordance with the appearance of the shape/puzzle pieces (e.g. responding with
"little" to both the appearance and reality questions of the standard verbal task) or a
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realism error it the answer was in accordance with the true size of the shape/puzzle
pieces (e.g. responding with "big" to both questions of the standard verbal task).
In order to determine which of the above response patterns was at the root of
children's below chance performance on the standard verbal and separated verbal tasks,
each incorrect trial was coded as either an inconsistent response error (i.e. two
different, but incorrect responses provided tor the appearance and reality questions) or
a consistent response error (i.e. the same response provided for both the appearance
and reality questions). Ot the 175 incorrect standard verbal trials, 16 were the result of
inconsistent response errors whereas 159 were the result of consistent response errors.
Likewise, of the 169 incorrect separated verbal trials, 21 were the result of inconsistent
response errors and 148 were the result of consistent response errors. As this pattern of
results clearly indicates, the below chance performance obtained in the verbal tasks of
the current experiment was primarily due to the fact that children systematically, but
incorrectly, responded with the same answers to both the appearance and reality
questions on the majority of the verbal trials. Further discussion of the pattern of errors
made can be found in the subsequent Analyses of Errors section.
In addition to the above patterns of interest, a second area of interest regarding
performance in the action versus the standard and separated verbal tasks was the
potential for learning to occur over trials. In this case, it was important to recognize the
fact that the correct response in the action task always involved selecting the smaller of
two available pieces. Moreover, feedback regarding the correctness ot each selection
was inherent in this task (i.e. the piece either fit or did not fit the puzzle), but was not
present at all in the standard or separated verbal tasks. As a result, it was possible that
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the observed improved performance in the action task may have been the result of
children learning to pick the small piece without any understanding of why this was the
correct selection (i.e. without a true understanding of or ability to make the appearance-
reality distinction).
In order to investigate the possible occurrence of learning just described,
it was reasoned that if children learned to select the correct piece over the course of the
four trials of the action task, then they generally should have responded incorrectly at
the onset of the task while responding correctly by the end of the task (i.e. responding
correctly on at least the very last trial). If, however, children understood the task and
were able to reason correctly right from the start, then they should have responded
correctly on the majority of trials in the task, including the very first one. Based on this
line of reasoning, the number of correct answers on each of the four trials was
computed for each task and is presented in Table 4. In the action task, correct
responses involved selecting the appropriate piece to complete the puzzle. In the
standard and separated verbal tasks, correct responses involved answering both the
appearance and reality questions of a given trial correctly (i.e. by responding “little”
and “big” to each question, respectively in the standard verbal task and by selecting the
piece that appeared to fit the puzzle and the piece that truly would fit the puzzle in
response to each respective question in the separated verbal task). The number ot
children who responded correctly on the very first trial of a given task, as well as on 2
or more subsequent trials of that task (i.e. 3 or more trials of a given task, including the
very first trial), then was computed for each task and is presented in the "Consistently
Correct Responders" column. Finally, the number of children who responded
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incorrectly on the very first trial but then responded correctly on the very last trial also
was computed for each task separately and is presented in the "Possible Learners
column of Table 4.
Table 4. Number of Correct Responses on Each Task of Experiment 1
Task Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4
Consistently
Correct
Possible
Learners
Responders
Standard Verbal Task 3 2 6 6 1 5
Action Task 27 30 24 28 18 9
Separated Verbal 9 4 7 3 0 2
Note: "Consistently Correct Responders" refer to children who responded correctly on
the majority of trials in a given task (i.e. 3 or more trials), including the very first trial.
In the action task, this meant consistently selecting the appropriate piece to complete
the puzzle. In the standard and separated verbal tasks, this meant consistently
responding with the correct answer to both the appearance and reality questions ol each
trial. “Possible Learners" refer to children who responded correctly on the very last,
but not the first trial of a given task.
As Table 4 indicates, 27 of the 48 children in the current experiment responded
correctly during the very first action trial. Moreover, 18 ot these children selected the
correct piece to fit the puzzle on the majority of subsequent action trials (i.e. 2 ot the 3
subsequent trials). Taken together, these results suggest that these children responded
based on their ability to make the distinction in this task rather than as the result ot
simply learning to select the smaller piece. The nine children who responded correctly
on the very last but not first action trial, on the other hand, may have learned to
respond
correctly over the course of the four trials of the action task, most-likely
as the result ot
the feedback that they received in each trial. A plausible alternative explanation
to
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learning, however, may be that these children responded correctly on the final trial hut
not the first trial simply based on chance.
Analyses of Phenomenism Prone Participants
During the action task, children had to override the currently available
perceptual information regarding the size of each available piece as viewed through the
minifying lens with their knowledge or memory of the actual size of these pieces in
order to select the one that would fit the missing space of each puzzle. It therefore was
reasonable to expect that children who made realism errors on the majority of the
standard verbal trials (i.e. by claiming that a shape both looked and truly was "big")
would continue to focus on the true sizes of the pieces behind the minifying lens during
the action task. Such a focus on the reality of the situation would be in accordance
with realism errors (and consequently, poor performance) on the standard verbal task
cbut would result in correct responses during the action task, which would neither
support nor disprove the action hypothesis. A preponderance of phenomenism errors
on the standard verbal trials, however, would not be concordant with correct responses
in the action task. In this situation, children who claimed that a target shape both
looked and truly was "little" in the standard verbal task should have selected the
incorrect piece to complete each puzzle in the action task. In other words, it was
reasonable to expect that these children would make their selections in the action task
based only on the appearances of the pieces behind the minifying lens, as they had
done in the standard verbal task. Selection of the correct piece by these "phenomenism
prone" children, however, would suggest that these children had some understanding of
the appearance-reality distinction and were able to express that understanding in an
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action-oriented, but not verbal-based, task. Consequently, such results would provide
support for the action hypothesis.
Based on the above line of reasoning, children’s errors on the standard verbal
task weO.re categorized as phenomenism, realism, or inconsistent errors (i.e. claims
that the shOape behind the minifying lens looked "big" but truly was "little"). Only
children who. made phenomenism errors on three or four standard verbal trials then
were selected for inclusion in a group (training, control) x order of presentation (orders
1, 2, 3) x task (standard verbal, action, separated verbal) mixed-design ANOVA, with
group and order as between-subjects factors and task as a within-subjects factor.
Table 5 lists the number of children included in each group and order of this analyses.
Table 5. Number of Phenomenism Prone Children in Experiment 1
Order Training Group Control Group
Order 1 4 4
Order 2 3 5
Order 3 4 3
Figure 5 depicts the mean proportion of trials correct on each of the three tasks
for each of the three orders of presentation separately for only those children who made
phenomenism errors on the majority of standard verbal trials. As this figure illustrates,
there was a significant main effect for task, F(2,34)=40.16, p<0.001, as well as a
significant task by order of presentation interaction, F(4,34)=3.13, p=0.04. There were
no group or order of presentation main effects or interactions involving the group
variable.
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Figure 5. Mean proportion of trials correct by task and order of presentation for
children who made phenomenism errors on three or more standard verbal trials in
Experiment 1 (order 1 ^standard verbal task, action task, separated verbal task, order
2=action task, separated verbal task, standard verbal task, order 3=separated verbal
task, standard verbal task, action task).
Again, inspection of the data presented in Figure 5 suggested that the task by
order of presentation interaction most-likely was due to differences among the three
groups with regard to their action task scores only. Therefore, pairwise contrasts of the
action task performances in each order were conducted using the Bonferroni adjusted t
statistic for K=3 contrasts. Although there were no significant differences among the
three orders according to this procedure, it is important to note that the children who
received the standard verbal task first (order 1 ) responded correctly on almost twice as
many action trials as those who received the action task first (order 2) (M=0.75,
SD=0.30, and M=0-38, SD=0.35, respectively), and an average of 0.29 trials more than
those who received the separated verbal task first (order 3) (M=0.46, SD=0.47).
77
Because the above analyses tailed to reveal any significant differences, the
differences between the three orders with regard to the patterns of performances
obtained in each task were investigated as a subsequent cause of the task by order of
presentation interaction. Pairwise contrasts between performances in each of the three
tasks were performed for each order separately using the Bonferroni adjusted t statistic
for K=9 contrasts. The results of each contrast can be found in Table 6.
Table 6. Results of Pairwise Contrasts for the Phenomenism Prone
Children of Experiment 1
Contrast df t D
Order 1
Standard Verbal v. Action Task 7 7.10 <0.01*
Standard Verbal v. Separated Verbal Task 7 1.53 >0.05
Action v. Separated Verbal Task 7 7.51 <0.01*
Order 2
Standard Verbal v. Action Task 7 2.83 >0.05
Standard Verbal v. Separated Verbal Task 7 0.55 >0.05
Action v. Separated Verbal Task 7 1.76 >0.05
Order 3
Standard Verbal v. Action Task 6 2.66 >0.05
Standard Verbal v. Separated Verbal Task 6 0.55 >0.05
Action v. Separated Verbal Task 6 2.19 >0.05
Note. Order l=standard verbal task, action task, separated verbal task, order 2=action
task, separated verbal task, standard verbal task, order 3=separated verbal task,
standard verbal task, action task.
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In short, performance in the action task was significantly better than in the
standard verbal and separated verbal tasks only for children who received the standard
verbal task first (order 1) (see Table 6 for significance levels). It is important to note,
however, that the differences between the action and standard verbal tasks, as well as
the action and separated verbal tasks, in the remaining two orders of presentation
followed a similar, yet non-significant pattern, with children in both orders performing
better in the action than in either the standard or separated verbal tasks (see Figure 5).
The failure of these differences to reach significance simply may have been due to the
low number of children included in each order of these analyses (i.e. n=8, 8, and 7 in
orders 1, 2, and 3 respectively).
Finally, in order to examine whether children who were phenomenism prone
performed significantly better in the action task due to their ability to make the
appearance-reality distinction or simply as the result of learning the correct response
over the course of the four trials, the number of children who responded correctly on
the first and last trials of this task were identified. Out of the 23 children who made
phenomenism errors on the majority of the standard verbal trials, 13 responded
correctly on the very first trial. Moreover, 9 of these 13 children responded correctly
on the majority of the action trials. Taken together, these results suggest that the
responses of slightly less than half of the children in the action task of the current
experiment were based on their understanding of this distinction.
Analyses of Errors
Because findings in previous appearance-reality studies centered on object
properties have found a predominance of phenomenism errors (e.g. Flavell et al., 1983;
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Flavell, Green, et al., 1987; Saap et al., 2000, etc.), the mean number of errors
classified as phenomenism, realism, or inconsistent errors were calculated for each
child in the standard verbal and separated verbal tasks separately. Table 7 lists the
mean occurrences of each type of error made in each of the two tasks separately.
Table 7. Mean Number of Errors Made in Experiment 1
Task Phenomenism Realism Inconsistent
Standard Verbal 2.04 (SD=1 .66) 1.27 (SD=1 .59) 0.33 (SD=0.81)
Separated Verbal 1.54 (SD=1.47) 1.54 (SD- 1.54) 0.44 (SD=0.62)
As Table 7 indicates, children made more phenomenism than realism or
inconsistent errors in the standard verbal task while making an equal number of
phenomenism and realism errors in the separated verbal task. A group (training,
control) x order of presentation (orders 1 , 2, 3) x task (standard verbal, separated
verbal) x error type (phenomenism, realism, inconsistent) mixed-design ANOVA with
group and order of presentation as between-subjects factors and task and error type as
within subjects factors, however, revealed only a significant main effect of error type,
F(2,84)=23.00, pO.OOl . Subsequent post-hoc analyses using the Bonferroni adjusted
t statistic with K=3 contrasts revealed significantly more phenomenism than
inconsistent errors, t(47)=6.91, pO.OOl and more realism than inconsistent errors,
t(47)=6.5 1
,
p<0.001. No significant difference was found, however, between the mean
number of phenomenism and realism errors made.
80
Discussion
The major goal of the current experiment was to examine the familiarization,
action, and dual representation hypotheses in the context of an appearance-reality task
centered on object properties. Children therefore were assigned randomly to the
control and training groups and were presented with four trials each of three different
tasks. The proportion of trials correct was then computed for each task separately and
the remaining errors in the standard verbal and separated verbal tasks were classified as
phenomenism, realism, or inconsistent errors.
According to the familiarity hypothesis, 3-year-olds typically fail traditional
appearance-reality tasks due to their lack of understanding regarding how the property-
distorting devices used in these tasks work (e.g. colored filters, minifying and
magnifying lenses, etc.). This hypothesis was based on the observation that children
typically are given little opportunity to become familiar with such devices prior to
testing. In order to test this hypothesis, half of the 3-year-olds in the current
experiment (i.e. those in the training group) were given hands-on training with the
property-distorting device used to create a typical size illusion (i.e. a minifying lens).
It was predicted that if familiarity with this property-distorting device held the key to
understanding the poor performance of children in traditional appearance-reality tasks,
then children in the training group would perform better than those in the control group
(i.e. those who did not receive training). The administered hands-on training, however,
did not affect performance: children in the training group did not perform any better
than children in the control group on any of the three appearance-reality tasks.
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Although it could be argued that the lack of increased performance in the
training versus control group was due to a need for more training or a different kind of
training to occur, this possibility seems unlikely. As described in the Method section,
children in the training group underwent extensive, hands-on training using the
minifying lens. Not only did the experimenter verbally explain how the lens worked
during device familiarization, but she also helped each child in the training group
perform numerous size transformations using this lens. One such transformation even
involved the child's own hand. During each of these transformations, the experimenter
pointed out that the lens made the target object only appear smaller than it was in
reality.
Perhaps one additional step that could have been taken to familiarize children
with the lens would have been to allow each child to take the lens home and explore
his/her environment with the lens over the course of several days prior to testing.
Given the extensive training present in the current experiment, however, it is doubtful
that even this type of training would have been effective. Consequently, it is
reasonable to conclude that the results of the current experiment do not support the
notion that the poor performance of 3-year-olds in traditional appearance-reality tasks
is simply the result of their lack of understanding regarding the property-distorting
devices used. Moreover, this conclusion is in accordance with that of Flavell et al.
(1986), who also found no benefit of training on children's performance in a traditional
appearance-reality task.
A second hypothesis investigated in the current experiment centered on the
assignment of conflicting representations to the same object. In the traditional
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appearance-reality task, the same object must be thought of in terms of how it appeared
both prior to and after being transformed by a property-distorting device (e.g. the
minifying lens used in the current study). According to the dual representation
hypothesis, this need to assign two conflicting representations to a single object may lie
at the root of children's poor performance in the traditional task. In the current
experiment, this requirement was eliminated by presenting children with two possible
answers for each of the appearance and reality questions (i.e. two available pieces for a
one-piece puzzle). In this case, children could reason that one piece really would fit
the puzzle while the remaining piece only looked like it would fit the puzzle without
ever having to acknowledge verbally that a single piece both looked like it would fit,
but really and truly was too large or looked too small to fit, but really and truly was just
right.
According to the above line of reasoning, it was predicted that children would
answer the appearance-reality questions posed in this separated verbal task correctly if
the ability to reason about conflicting representations was the sole reason for their
failure in the traditional task. Eliminating the need to reason about dual representations
in this way, however, did not result in improved performance: there were no
differences between children's performances in this separated verbal task compared to
the standard verbal task (i.e. traditional appearance-reality task). In short, the results of
this experiment also do not support the dual representation hypothesis: the need to
reason about dual representations does not seem to lie at the heart of 3 -year-olds'
difficulties with traditional appearance-reality tasks.
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The final hypothesis investigated in the current experiment was based on the
potential for confusion to occur with regard to the language used to describe the
appearance-reality distinction. According to this action hypothesis, children may be
confused by the phrases used to describe the distinction in traditional appearance-
reality tasks (i.e. "looks like to your eyes" and "really and truly"). Consequently, they
may respond to the traditional appearance-reality questions incorrectly despite their
ability to distinguish appearances from reality. In order to eliminate this problem,
children in the current experiment were presented with an action-based task in which
they were shown a one-piece puzzle along with two available pieces. With a minifying
lens placed in front of the pieces, the children were asked to indicate which piece they
wished to use in order to complete the puzzle. It was predicted that if the problem with
the traditional task was rooted in the language used to describe the distinction, then
children should perform significantly better in this action task than in the standard
verbal and separated verbal tasks of the current experiment. This indeed was the case.
Children in each of the three orders of presentation performed better on the action task
than on either the standard verbal or separated verbal tasks, suggesting that the
language requirements of traditional, verbal-based appearance-reality tasks mask
young 3-year-olds' competence in distinguishing appearance from reality.
As mentioned in the results section, one interesting aspect of the improved
performance of children in the action versus the standard and separated verbal tasks
was the potential for learning to occur over trials. Because a correct response in the
action task always involved selecting the smaller of two available pieces in order to
complete the puzzle, it was possible that the observed improvement in performance in
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the action task simply was the result of children learning to pick the piece that appeared
too small to fit the puzzle without any understanding of why this selection was correct
(i.e. without a true understanding of or ability to make the appearance-reality
distinction). The finding that more than 50% of the children who made primarily
phenomenism errors during the standard verbal trials responded correctly during the
very first action trial, however, suggests that this was not the case. When compared to
the 30-40% of children who typically respond to the traditional appearance-reality
questions correctly (Flavell, 1988), this finding provides additional support for the
claim that children in the current experiment were better able to express their
understanding of the appearance-reality distinction in an action-oriented rather than a
verbal-based appearance-reality task.
On the surface, the pattern of results obtained in the current experiment appear
to suggest that 3-year-olds do have some basic understanding of the appearance-reality
distinction that is masked by the verbal requirements of the traditional task. In light of
the finding that performance in the action task did not differ from chance, however,
children's improved performance in this task cannot be taken as evidence that the 3-
year-olds in this experiment truly understood or were able to make this distinction
reliably. At the same time, it is important to note that performance in the standard
verbal and separated verbal tasks was significantly below chance. Therefore, a more
moderate conclusion based on these results would suggest that the elimination of the
language typically used in traditional, verbal-based appearance-reality tasks helped to
alleviate the dominance of a systematic pattern of errors typically made in the
traditional task.
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In addition to the above major findings, the fact that action task performance
varied as a function of order of presentation also deserves some attention.
Surprisingly, children who participated in the standard verbal task just prior to the
action task (i.e. those in order 1) performed better in the action task than those who
participated in the action task first (i.e. those in order 2). 1 his finding was unexpected
given the results of previous studies employing action-oriented appearance-reality
tasks. For instance, Saap et al. (2000) found that initial participation in a traditional,
verbal-based appearance-reality task actually dampened the improved performance of
children in a subsequent action-based task. At the same time, Gauvain and Greene
(1994) found that performance in an action-based task did not vary as the result of prior
participation in a traditional, verbal-based task.
Although one possible explanation for the observed order effect in the current
experiment may be that participating in the standard verbal task somehow helped
children reason about the appearance-reality distinction during the subsequent action
task, this explanation does not fit with the action task performances of children in order
3. As in order 1, children in order 3 were presented with the standard verbal task
immediately prior to the action task, yet they did not perform any better during the
subsequent action task than children in order 2. Despite this fact, it is important to
recognize the possibility that participating in the separated verbal task prior to the
standard verbal and action tasks in order 3 may have somehow interfered with the
proposed benefit of participating in the standard verbal task immediately prior to the
action task. Even in this light, however, there is no reasonable explanation for why
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participating in the standard verbal task would result in improved action task
performance, therefore, this explanation ol the results is largely unsatisfying.
A second plausible explanation for the observed differences in action task
performance may lie in the fact that children in order 1 had more experience viewing
objects through the minifying lens, as well as more time to adjust to the testing
procedure, by the time that they were presented with the action task procedure than
children in order 2. In light of the fact that there were no effects of training on action
task performance, however, the argument that children in order 1 performed better on
the action task than those in order 2 simply because they had more experience viewing
objects through the minifying lens is unconvincing. Moreover, if the proposed "warm-
up" effects were responsible for the observed differences, then children in order 3 (i.e.
those who participated in the action task last) should have performed better on this task
than children in orders 1 and 2 because they had the most time to adjust to the
procedure and viewed the most objects through the minifying lens prior to participating
in the action task. This, however, was not the case: children in order 3 performed no
differently on the action task than those in orders 1 or 2.
Despite the fact that children in order 3 performed no differently on the action
task than those in orders 1 or 2, it is important to recognize the possibility that because
children in order 3 participated in the action task at the very end of the testing session,
the usefulness of the proposed "warm-up" factors may have been cancelled out by
fatigue. If this were the case, then there should have been similar signs ol fatigue
during the final tasks of orders 1 and 2 as well (i.e. the separated verbal and standard
verbal tasks, respectively). Unfortunately, it is impossible to know whether
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performance in the final tasks of orders 1 and 2 were affected by fatigue because
performance in these tasks (i.e. the standard verbal and separated verbal tasks) were at
floor in each of the three orders, regardless of when these tasks were presented in the
session. With this in mind, the warm-up effects mentioned here may provide the most
reasonable explanation for the observed order effect in action task performance.
Finally, it is important to note that previous studies employing the traditional
appearance-reality task have reported that children make more phenomenism than
realism errors when presented with objects that have deceptive properties (e.g. Flavell,
Flavell, & Green, 1983; see Flavell, 1988 for review). As in these studies, there were
generally more phenomenism than realism errors made during the standard verbal task
of the current experiment (98 versus 61, respectively). Despite this asymmetry in the
types of errors made, however, this difference was not significant. Therefore, the
pattern of errors reported in previous appearance-reality studies was not replicated in
the standard verbal task of the current experiment.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENT 2
Design and Predictions
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to investigate children s understanding of the
appearance-reality distinction using a new means for creating an appearance-reality
illusion. Based on the reaching-in-the-dark task created by McCarty et al. (2002), the
“property-distorting device” used in this experiment was the dark. Through the use of
darkness, several large shapes were made to appear much smaller than they were in
reality. This was done by painting a small, camouflaged glow-in-the-dark shape in the
center of each large shape. Because only this small, glow-in-the-dark shape was
visible in the dark, each large shape appeared to be much smaller than its original size
when viewed in the dark versus the light.
Over the past 20 years, studies utilizing darkness have provided numerous
researchers with valuable insight into the knowledge and reasoning abilities of infants
and toddlers with regard to the existence and properties of objects (e.g. size) that can
no longer be seen (e.g. Clifton, Rochat, Litovsky, & Perris, 1991, Hood & Willatts,
1986, Wishart, Bower, & Dunkeld, 1978, etc.). Because the presentation of objects in
the dark eliminates all distracting visual stimuli, it has been argued that the dark
provides a useful tool by which the attention of infants can be focused on the crucial
elements of the task at hand (Clifton, 2001). In the context of the current appearance-
reality task, it was reasoned that using the dark as a property-distorting device might
help focus children's attention on the primary property that had been altered, namely,
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the size of the object, which in turn might help them reason about the appearance-
reality distinction.
In addition to focusing children’s attention on the task demands at hand, the use
ot darkness as a property-distorting tool also provided a unique way of examining the
action hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, children should be able to express
their understanding of the appearance-reality distinction in an action-oriented but not
verbal-based task. Although the action task of Experiment 1 provided children with
the opportunity to express this understanding in an action-based, rather than a verbal-
based task, the extent to which this task was purely action-oriented is debatable. As
described in Experiment 1, children first had to indicate which of two available pieces
they wished to use in order to complete a target puzzle. Often, the only way to do so
involved a verbal response (e.g. telling the experimenter the location of the desired
piece). Based on this response, the experimenter then would retrieve the selected piece
and hand it to the child in order for him/her to complete the puzzle.
The necessity for the experimenter to retrieve the pieces indicated by the
children in Experiment 1 was the sole consequence of the property-distorting device
used in that experiment (i.e. the minifying lens). Children could not move from in
front of the minifying lens in order to retrieve the desired pieces themselves because it
they did, the pieces no longer would have been viewed through the lens. In this case,
the illusion created by the lens would not have provided children with the conflicting
size information crucial to any appearance-reality task during the time that their
selections were made.
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Whereas the use of the minifying lens in Experiment 1 limited the extent to
which the action task relied solely on children’s actions per-se, the use of darkness in
the current experiment eliminated the above action constraints. By creating the
necessary size illusions in the dark, children were able to make free, direct reaches and
obtain the pieces that they desired themselves without the risk of interfering with the
illusion. No matter where the child was positioned in the dark, the crucial illusion of
the available pieces appearing to be smaller than they were in the light did not change.
As a result, the use of darkness as a property-distorting device truly allowed children to
use direct, action-based responses in order to solve the action task.
As in Experiment 1, each 3-year-old in Experiment 2 participated in three types
of test tasks. After undergoing a period of familiarization with glow-in-the-dark
objects, children in this experiment were presented with the standard verbal, action,
and separated verbal tasks of Experiment 1 using glow-in-the-dark puzzles and shapes.
In the standard verbal task, 3 -year-olds were presented with four, large wooden
cutouts of different shapes in both the light and the dark. A smaller, yet visually
identical glow-in-the-dark version of each large shape was painted in the center of each
cutout. Once the lights were extinguished, only the smaller version of each shape was
visible (i.e. it glowed in the dark) (see Figure 7 of the Procedure section for
illustration). While in the dark, children were asked the traditional appearance-reality
questions used in the standard verbal task of Experiment 1
.
In order to examine the action and dual representation hypotheses, children s
performance in the above standard verbal task was compared to their performance in an
action and separated verbal task. These tasks were analogous to those of Experiment 1
.
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During the four trials of each task, children were presented with a glow-in-the-dark
puzzle along with two potential pieces, one that was too large and one that was a
perfect fit for the missing space of the puzzle. Painted in the center of each piece was
an identical, camouflaged, glow-in-the-dark shape that was half the size of the original
piece. When viewed in the dark, only the puzzle, its missing space, and the two pieces
were visible. Moreover, the two pieces now appeared to be a smaller than they were in
the light (i.e. the one that was too large now appeared to be just right and the one that
was just right appeared to be too small) (see Figure 6 of the Procedure section for
illustration). During each trial of the action task, children were asked to retrieve the
correct piece and complete the puzzle in the dark. During the separated verbal task, on
the other hand, children were asked the same appearance-reality questions used in the
separated verbal task of Experiment 1 while in the dark.
As in Experiment 1, it was predicted that if the action hypothesis was correct
and children are able to demonstrate their knowledge of the appearance-reality
distinction in action-oriented but not verbal-based task, then children in Experiment 2
should override the apparent sizes of the available pieces with their understanding of
the true sizes of these pieces in order to complete each puzzle successfully. At the
same time, it was hypothesized that if the illusion created in the dark was equivalent to
the illusions created by the property-distorting devices typically used in traditional
appearance-reality studies, then children would commit phenomenism errors when
answering the questions of the standard verbal task. On the other hand, if the ability to
reason about conflicting dual representations is a problem for 3-year-olds in the
traditional appearance-reality task, then the children in this experiment should perform
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significantly better in the separated verbal tasks than in either the action or standard
verbal task of the current experiment.
Method
Participants
A total of 31 participants were recruited from Massachusetts' state birth records
with an explanatory letter followed by a telephone call. The data from eight of these
children were eliminated due to a failure to complete all three tasks (n=l) and failure to
reach criteria during puzzle familiarization (n=6). Each of the remaining 24
participants were randomly assigned to one of three orders of task presentation until
there were 8 children in each order. Half of the children in each of the three orders of
task presentation (6 male, 6 female) were tested at the University of Massachusetts
Amherst while the remaining half (6 male, 6 female) were tested at the Child Study
Center in Springfield, Massachusetts. These participants ranged in age from 3 years, 1
week to 3 years, 1 month, and 5 days, with a mean age of 3 years, 2 weeks, and 5 days
(SD= 9.27 days).
Materials
The same twelve, one piece puzzles used in Experiment 1 served as the primary
stimuli for Experiment 2. Because the familiar objects painted on these puzzles were
painted in florescent, glow-in-the-dark paint, these objects, minus their missing pieces,
were visible in the dark. As in Experiment 1, the missing pieces again consisted of 5
by 5 cm triangles, hearts, squares, and circles. For the current experiment,
however, an
identical, glow-in-the-dark shape that was half the size of the original
piece was
93
painted in the center of each piece. The remainder of each pi ece was painted with
matching, ordinary florescent paint. As a result, each piece appeared to be half its size
when viewed in the dark and consequently, appeared too small to fit the missing space
of the target puzzle (see Figure 6 for example).
Figure 6. Example of puzzle and size of two pieces as they appeared in the light (top)
and the dark (bottom). The piece that appeared too large to fit the puzzle in the light
(top piece) appeared just right in the dark and the piece that appeared just right in the
light (bottom piece) appeared too small to fit the puzzle in the dark.
In addition to the pieces just described, additional pieces that did not fit the
puzzles also were used. As in Experiment 1, these pieces were either too small or too
large. For each of the four missing piece shapes (i.e. triangles, circles, hearts, and
squares), there was an identical shape that was approximately half the size of the actual
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missing piece (i.e. 2.5 by 2.5 cm) and an identical shape that was twice its size (i.e. 10
by 10 cm). Painted inside each large, 10 by 10 cm piece was an identical glow-in-the-
dark shape that was half its size (i.e. 5 by 5 cm). The remainder of the piece was
painted with matching, ordinary, florescent paint. Because only the glow-in-the-dark
paint was visible in the dark, each large piece appeared to be half its size when viewed
in the dark. As a result, each piece that was too large to fit the missing space of a
puzzle appeared to be just the right size when viewed in the dark (see Figure 6 for
example).
Figure 7. Example of an additional shape (the shamrock) used
during the dark
familiarization period in the light (top) and the dark (bottom).
The shape appeared to
be half its original size in the dark.
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Three additional wooden cutouts measuring approximately 9.5 by 9.5 cm also
were used during the dark familiarization portion of each session. As in Experiment 1
.
the shapes ot these cutouts included a blue star, an orange hand, and a green shamrock.
As with the previously described shapes, each cutout had an identical, glow-in-the-dark
shape painted in its center. Consequently, each shape appeared to be half of its true
size when viewed in the dark (i.e. 4.75 by 4.75 cm) (see Figure 7 for example).
Finally, all of the pieces and shapes described thus far had a small button of Velcro
attached to their backsides so that they could be attached to a white, 74.5 by 55.5 cm
foamboard background for presentation purposes.
As in Experiment 1, a hand puppet named "Spot the Dog", along with a puppet-
sized ghost costume, was used during the term familiarization portion of the session. A
small, 5 x 4 cm glow-in-the-dark plastic figurine of a frog also was used, but only
during the period of dark familiarization. Each testing session was videotaped using an
infrared video camera aimed over the child's shoulder, providing a view of the
materials and selections of each child in both the light and the dark.
Procedure
Each child sat at a table in front of and approximately 36 cm away from an
upright piece of white foamboard that provided the background stage tor the session.
All of the children in the current experiment took part in a period of puzzle and term
familiarization identical to that of Experiment 1. In order to familiarize children with
the glow-in-the-dark objects used in the current experiment, each child also
participated in a period of dark familiarization following the puzzle and term
familiarization phases. The purpose of this familiarization was to introduce children to
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the illusions created by the glow-in-the-dark objects as well as to give them hands-on
experience handling these objects.
Dark Familiarization
At the onset of the dark familiarization period, each child was allowed to
handle a glow-in-the dark, plastic frog in both the dark and the light. After handling
this toy twice, a blue wooden cutout of a star was given to the child. In the dark, this
star appeared to be half its size, as a second, camouflaged star was painted in its center
with glow-in-the-dark paint. Before extinguishing the lights, the experimenter
instructed the child to hold the cutout so that s/he could "feel" the parts of the star that
were no longer visible. With the lights off, the experimenter commented on the small
appearance of the star in the dark compared to its large size in the light. Two
additional cutouts in the shape of a hand and a shamrock also were viewed in this
manner.
Test Tasks
Following each of the three familiarization periods, children proceeded to the
testing portion of the session. During this time, they were presented with three
different tasks in order to test the action and dual representation hypotheses. As in
Experiment 1
,
it was unclear whether the completion of certain tasks would affect
children's performance in subsequent tasks, therefore, the order in which the three tasks
were presented varied. One-third of the children in each group was assigned
randomly
to begin with the standard verbal task, followed by the action task, and ending
with the
separated verbal task (order 1), while one-third began with the action task
first.
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followed by the separated verbal and then standard verbal task (order 2). The
remaining one-third of the children in each group began with the separated verbal task
first, followed by the standard verbal and action tasks, respectively (order 3). An equal
number of males and females participated in each of these three different orders.
The Standard Verbal Task
The aim of the standard verbal task was to replicate the findings of traditional
appearance-reality studies (e.g. Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1986) using a new set of
materials and illusions. During each of the four trials of this task, a single shape was
placed against the foamboard background and the lights then were extinguished.
Because each shape had an identical, glow-in-the-dark shape that was half its size
painted in its center, the shape appeared to be much smaller when viewed in the dark
than in the light. While viewing each shape in the dark, children were asked the same
traditional appearance-reality questions used in Experiment 1 and received no feedback
with regard to the correctness of their answers. The order in which the appearance and
reality questions were asked was fixed and followed the order used in Experiment 1
.
Moreover, the size mentioned first in the question (i.e. "big" or "little") was
randomized over the four trials for each child. The order in which the four shapes
were presented is listed in the Appendix.
The Action Task
In contrast to the standard verbal task, each child was asked to complete a series
of puzzles instead of answering a series of verbal questions during the action task of
the current experiment. During the four trials of this task, each child was presented
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with a puzzle that was placed upright on a stand to his/her right. Two pieces, one that
was too large and one that fit the puzzle, then were placed, one above the other, against
the foamboard background and the lights were extinguished. At this point, only the
two pieces, along with the puzzle and its missing space, were visible (refer to Figure 6
for illustration). Again, an identical, glow-in-the-dark shape that was half the size of
each piece was painted in its center. Consequently, the correct piece appeared to be too
small and the large one appeared to be a perfect fit for the puzzle when viewed in the
dark. While in the dark, each child was asked to select the correct piece and complete
the puzzle.
If a child selected the incorrect piece during the action task, the immediate
consequence was clear: the selected piece did not fit the puzzle. When this occurred,
the experimenter turned on the lights and re-emphasized the fact that the piece only
looked as if it would fit the puzzle in the dark, but really and truly, was too big. The
lights then were extinguished and the child was given the opportunity to complete the
puzzle with the remaining piece. The position of the correct piece on each trial (i.e. top
or bottom) was fixed and followed the order used in Experiment 1 . The reference to
the position of the piece mentioned first in each question (i.e. "top" or "bottom") also
was randomized across trials for each child. The Appendix lists the order in which the
four puzzles used in this task were presented.
The Separated Verbal Task
The purpose of the separated verbal task was to examine the dual representation
hypothesis. As in the action task, each child was presented with four trials during
which a puzzle was introduced and placed upright on a stand to the child s right. Two
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pieces, one that was too large and one that was just right, then were placed, one above
the other, against the foamboard background and the lights were extinguished. While
in the dark, each child was asked the same appearance and reality questions posed
during the separated verbal task of Experiment 1 . The order in which the appearance
and reality questions were asked, along with the position of the piece that truly fit the
puzzle (i.e. top or bottom), was fixed and followed the order used in Experiment 1
.
The location mentioned first in each question (i.e. top or bottom) also was randomized
across trials. The order in which each of the four puzzles set aside for this task were
presented can be found in the Appendix.
Scoring
Videotapes of the testing sessions were coded by two independent observers,
with a primary observer scoring all of the testing sessions and a secondary observer
scoring only half of the testing sessions for reliability. For the trials presented during
the standard verbal task, observers recorded each child's first verbal response to the two
traditional appearance-reality questions asked. These responses then were coded as
either correct responses (i.e. a child indicated that the shape looked "little" but really
was "big"), phenomenism errors (i.e. a child indicated that the shape looked "little" and
really was "little"), realism errors (i.e. a child indicated that the shape looked "big" and
really was "big"), or inconsistent errors (i.e. a child indicated that the shape looked
"big" but really was "little").
For each of the trials presented during the action task, the observers recorded
each child's initial piece selection. Following the same reasoning presented in
Experiment 1
,
only the non-verbal, action responses of children who verbally indicated
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one piece while simultaneously retrieving the opposite piece was recorded. Again, this
response was extremely rare, occurring on only 1 of the 96 trials of this task.
f inally, for each separated verbal trial, observers recorded each child's first
response to the two traditional appearance-reality questions asked. In this task,
children often responded to these questions by pointing to a given piece without
verbally responding to the question. In such instances, these non-verbal responses
were recorded by the observers. Several children also responded by pointing to one
location and verbally identifying the opposite location on several trials. Again, these
instances were rare, with 5 children responding in this manner on a total of 6 out of the
192 questions asked during the 96 trials of this task. Based on the line of reasoning
presented in Experiment 1 , the observers recorded only the verbal responses to these 6
questions. As in the standard verbal task, the recorded responses to the appearance
and reality questions of each trial were coded as either correct responses (i.e. a child
correctly answered both questions), phenomenism errors (i.e. a child selected the piece
that looked like it would fit the puzzle but truly was too large in response to both
questions), realism errors (i.e. a child selected the piece that truly would fit the puzzle
but looked too small in response to both questions), or inconsistent errors (i.e. a child
selected the wrong pieces in response to each of the two questions).
Inter-Observer Reliability
The reliability between observers was computed as the number of agreements
divided by the total number of responses scored by both observers. Because scoring of
the data involved categorizing children's responses as correct or incorrect, Cohen s
Kappa coefficient also was computed as a measure of observer agreement. Of the 240
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responses scored, the primary and secondary observers agreed on a total of 239
responses, or 99.6% of the data (Cohen’s Kappa=0.99). Because the secondary
observer scored only 50% of the responses, only the judgments of the primary observer
were used in the subsequent analyses.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
In order to ensure that there were no significant age differences among the
various groups in the current experiment, a gender (male, female) x location of test
(Amherst, Springfield) x order of presentation (orders 1, 2, 3) factorial Analysis of
Variance (ANOVA) was conducted on children's age in days at time of test. As
expected, there were no significant main effects or interactions.
In order to determine whether there were any significant differences involving
gender and/or location of task (i.e. Springfield versus Amherst), preliminary analyses
of the data also were conducted on the overall proportion of trials correct. No
significant main effects or interactions were revealed, therefore, the data were
collapsed across these dimensions on all subsequent analyses.
Analyses of Correct Trials
As pointed out in Chapters 1 and 2, 3-year-olds who are presented with a
traditional, verbal-based appearance-reality task centered on object properties typically
make phenomenism errors, claiming that a target object truly is as it misleadingly
appears to be (see Flavell et al., 1983; Flavell et ah, 1986; Flavell, Green, et ah, 1987,
Saap et ah, 2000, etc.). As in Experiment 1 , it was reasoned that if such findings
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accurately represent children's inability to distinguish appearance from reality, then
children in the current experiment should have been captured by the misleading
appearances of the shapes and/or puzzle pieces in the dark. Consequently, these
children should have performed poorly in each of the three test tasks presented, that is,
there should have been no differences in performance among the three different tasks.
In order to examine the above possibility, as well as the action and dual
representation hypotheses, the proportion of trials correct on each of the three tasks was
calculated for each child. An order of presentation (orders 1, 2, 3) x task (standard
verbal, action, separated verbal) mixed-design ANOVA then was conducted, with
order of presentation as a between-subjects factor and task as a within-subjects factor.
The means in each of these conditions appear in Table 8.
Table 8. Mean Proportion of Correct Responses on Each Task of Experiment 2
Order
Standard Verbal
Task
Action Task
Separated Verbal
Task
Order 1 0.19 (SD=0.22) 0.81 (SD=0.22) 0.19 (SD=0.22)
Order 2 0.03 (SD=0.09) 0.72 (SD=0.25) 0.13 (SD=0.13)
Order 3 0.03 (SD=0.09) 0.5 (SD=0.38) 0.16 (SD=0.19)
Note. Order l=standard verbal task, action task, separated verbal task, order 2=action
task, separated verbal task, standard verbal task, order 3=separated verbal task,
standard verbal task, action task.
According to the action hypothesis, children should have performed better in
the action task (which eliminated the need for verbal responses to the traditional
appearance-reality questions) than in the standard verbal and separated verbal tasks.
The dual representation hypothesis, on the other hand, predicted that children should
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have performed better in the separated verbal task (which eliminated the need for
children to assign conflicting representations to a single object) than in the action and
standard verbal tasks.
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Figure 8. Mean proportion of trials correct in Experiment 2 by task and order of
presentation (order l=standard verbal task, action task, separated verbal task, order
2=action task, separated verbal task, standard verbal task, order 3=separated verbal
task, standard verbal task, action task).
Figure 8 illustrates the mean proportion of trials correct in each of the three
tasks and for each of the three different orders of presentation separately. As illustrated
by this figure, there was a significant main effect for task, F(2,42)=53.97, p<0.001.
Subsequent post-hoc analyses using the Bonferroni adjusted t statistic for K=3
contrasts revealed that the mean proportion of trials correct was significantly higher in
the action task than in the standard verbal task (M=0.68, SD=0.16 and M=0.08,
SD=0.31, respectively), t(23)=10.62, g<0.001. Moreover, the mean proportion of trials
correct also was significantly higher in the action task than in the separated verbal task,
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(M-0. 1 7, SD=0. 1 8), t(23)=6.80, p<0.00 1 . The proportion of trials correct on the
standard verbal and separated verbal tasks, however, did not differ significantly from
each other. Taken together, these results support the action, but not the dual
representation hypothesis: children performed better in the action task than in either
the standard or separated verbal tasks.
In addition to the above main effect for task, there also was a significant order
of presentation main effect, F(2,21)=3.65, p=0.04. There was, however, no significant
interaction between the task and order of presentation variables. Post-hoc contrasts
using the Bonferroni adjusted t statistic for K=3 contrasts revealed that the main order
of presentation effect was due to children in order 1 performing significantly better
overall than children in order 3 (M=0.40, SD=0.9 and M=0.23, SD= 0.15,
respectively), t(14)=2.78, p<0.05.
Taken together, the results of the current experiment clearly indicate that the
performance patterns obtained in the current experiment were not in line with the poor,
across task performance predicted by the results obtained in previous, traditional,
verbal-based appearance-reality studies (e.g. Flavell et al., 1983; Flavell et al., 1986;
Flavell, Green, et al., 1987; Saap et al., 2000, etc.). Instead, performance in the current
experiment was in accordance with that obtained in Experiment 1, with children
performing better in the action task than in either the standard verbal or separated
verbal tasks.
As in Experiment 1
,
it was important to examine the findings obtained in the
action task of the current experiment closely in order to better understand their
implications. Because there were only two possible answers in this task (i.e. children
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had to choose between two available puzzle pieces), each child had a 50% chance of
making the appropriate selection it s/he simply selected pieces at random. In contrast
to Experiment 1, the mean proportion of trials correct in the action task of the current
experiment was 0.68 trials (SD=0.31), which was significantly different from chance,
t(23)=2.82, p<0.01. As in Experiment 1, however, it is important to note than when
action task performance was examined in each order of presentation separately, the
action task performances of children in orders 1 and 2 only were significantly above
chance, with 95% confidence intervals of 0.81 ± 0.19 trials and 0.72 ± 0.21 trials
respectively, t(7)=3.99, p<0.01 and t(7) =2.50, p<0.05, respectively. The action task
performance of children in order 3, however, was at chance (M=0.50, SD=0.38).
Taken together, these results suggest that the majority of the children in the current
experiment (i.e. those in orders 1 and 2) generally performed better in the action task
than in the standard and separated verbal tasks as the result of consistently selecting the
correct piece across the four trials of the action task. Children in order 3, however,
may have done so as the result of making random selections.
In addition to the above investigation of action task performance, an
examination of standard verbal and separated verbal task performance also provided
insight into the obtained pattern of results. Because there were two questions per trial
(i.e. an appearance and a reality question) in both the standard and separated verbal
tasks, each with two possible responses/selections, there was a 25% chance ot
responding with the appropriate answer to both questions of any given verbal trial. The
observed mean proportion of trials correct in the standard verbal task (M=0.08 trials,
SD=0.16), therefore, was significantly below chance, with a 95% confidence interval
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ot'0.08 ± 0.07 trials, t(23)=5.127, £<0.001
. Again, however, it is important to note that
this pattern held only for children in orders 2 and 3, each with respective 95%
confidence intervals of 0.03 ± 0.07, t(7)=7.0, £<0.001. Children in order 1, on the
other hand, did not perform significantly different chance, t(7)=0.80, £<0.05. At the
same time, the observed mean proportion of trials correct in the separated verbal task
(M=0.16 trials, SD=0.18) also was significantly below chance, with a 95% confidence
interval of 0.16 ± 0.08 trials, t(23)=2.58, £=0.02. When performance in each of the
three orders was examined separately, however, this pattern held only for children in
order 2, with a 95% confidence interval of 0.13 ± 0.12 trials, t(7)=2.65, p>0.05.
Children in orders 1 and 3 did not perform significantly different from chance
(M=0.19, SD=0.22 and M=0.16, SD=0.19, respectively), t(7)=0.80, p>0.05 and
t(7)=1.43, £>0.05.
As in Experiment 1, two possible explanations may account for children's poor
performance in the standard and separated verbal tasks. Again, each explanation
centers on the fact that in order to respond correctly on any given verbal trial, a child
had to provide two different, but correct answers to the appearance and reality
questions of that trial. In contrast, there were two response patterns that could have
resulted in incorrect trial performance, an inconsistent response pattern and a consistent
response pattern. As pointed out in Experiment 1
,
the inconsistent pattern involved
responding with two different, but incorrect answers to the appearance and reality
questions of a given trial. In the standard verbal task, for example, this occurred when
a child indicated that a single shape appeared "big" through the minifying lens but truly
was "little". At the same time, however, it also was possible to be incorrect on a
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standaid or separated verbal trial by providing the same, consistent answers to both the
appearance and reality questions ol that trial. This response pattern resulted in a
phenomenism error if the answer was in accordance with only the appearance of the
shape/puzzle pieces (e.g. responding with "little" to both the appearance and reality
questions ot the standard verbal task) or a realism error if the answer was in accordance
with the true size of the shape/puzzle pieces (e.g. responding with "big" to both
questions of the standard verbal task).
In order to determine which of the above pattern of responses was at the root of
children's poor verbal task performances, each incorrect trial was coded as either an
inconsistent response error (i.e. two different, but incorrect responses provided for the
appearance and reality questions) or a consistent response error (i.e. the same response
provided for both the appearance and reality questions). Of the 88 incorrect standard
verbal trials, 83 were the result of consistent errors. Likewise, of the 8 1 incorrect
separated verbal trials, 73 were the result of consistent errors. Taken together, these
results suggest that the poor performances obtained in the standard and separated
verbal tasks of the current experiment clearly were the result of children systematically,
but incorrectly, responding with the same answers to both the appearance and reality
questions of these tasks. Further discussion of the pattern of errors made can be found
in the subsequent Analyses of Errors section.
In addition to the above areas of interest regarding children's performance in
each of the three tasks, an additional area of interest was the potential for learning to
occur over the four trials of the action task. As in Experiment 1, the correct response in
the action task of the current experiment always involved selecting the smaller ot the
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two available pieces. Moreover, feedback regarding the correctness of each selection
was inherent in this task (i.e. the piece either fit or did not fit the puzzle), but was not
present at all in the remaining verbal tasks. As a result, it was possible that the
observed improved performance in this task simply was the results of children learning
to pick the small piece without any understanding of why this selection was correct
(i.e. without a true understanding of or ability to make the appearance-reality
distinction).
In order to examine the above learning hypothesis, it was reasoned that if
children learned to select the correct piece over the course of the four trials of the
action task, then they should have responded incorrectly at the onset of the task while
responding correctly by the end of the task (i.e. responding correctly on at least the
very last trial). If, however, they understood the task and were able to reason correctly
right from the start, then they should have responded correctly on the majority of trials
in the task, including the very first one. Based on this line of reasoning, the number of
correct answers on each of the four trials was computed for each task separately and is
presented in Table 9. In the action task, correct responses involved selecting the
appropriate piece to complete the puzzle. In the standard and separated verbal tasks,
correct responses involved answering both the appearance and reality questions ot a
given trial correctly (i.e. by responding “little” and ‘big” to each question, respectively
in the standard verbal task and by selecting the piece that appeared to tit the puzzle and
the piece that truly would fit the puzzle in response to each respective question in the
separated verbal task). The number of children who responded correctly on the very
first trial of a given task, as well as on 2 or more subsequent trials of that task (i.e. 3 or
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more trials ot given task, including the very first trial), also was computed for each task
and is presented in the "Consistently Correct Responders" column. Finally, the number
ot children who responded incorrectly on the very first trial but correctly on the very
last trial of a given task also was computed tor each task and is presented in the
"Possible Learners" column of Table 9.
Table 9. Number of Correct Responses on Each Task of Experiment 2
Task Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4
Consistently
Correct
Possible
Learners
Responders
Standard Verbal Task 4 0 1 3 0 2
Action Task 9 19 17 20 8 12
Separated Verbal 4 6 4 1 0 1
Note: "Consistently Correct Responders" refer to children who responded correctly on
the majority of trials in a given task (i.e. 3 or more trials), including the very first trial.
In the action task, this meant consistently selecting the appropriate piece to complete
the puzzle. In the standard and separated verbal tasks, this meant consistently
responding with the correct answer to both the appearance and reality questions ot each
trial. "Possible Learners" refer to children who responded correctly on the very last,
but not the first trial in a given task.
As Table 9 indicates, 9 of the 24 children in the current experiment responded
correctly during the very first action trial. Moreover, 8 of these children selected the
correct piece to fit the puzzle on the majority of subsequent action trials (i.e. 2 of the 3
subsequent trials). Taken together, these results suggest that these children responded
based on their ability to make the distinction in this task rather than as the result ot
simply learning to select the smaller piece. The 12 children who responded correctly
on the very last but not first action trial, on the other hand, may have learned
to respond
correctly over the course of the four trials of the action task, most-likely
as the result ot
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the feedback that they received in each trial. A plausible alternative explanation to this
learning hypothesis, however, may be that these children responded correctly on the
final trial but not the first trial simply as the result of chance.
Analyses of Phenomenism Prone Participants
As in Experiment 1, children who made phenomenism errors on the majority of
the standard verbal trials were of particular interest in the current experiment. In this
situation, children who claimed that the target shape both looked and truly was "little"
on the majority of standard verbal trials should have selected the incorrect pieces to
complete the puzzles in the action task. In other words, these children should have
continued to focus only on the apparent size of the pieces in the action task as they had
done during the standard verbal task. Selection of the correct pieces in the action task
by these same phenomenism prone children, however, would have been unexpected.
Moreover, such selections would provide support for the action hypothesis by
indicating that these children were able to express some understanding of the
appearance-reality distinction in an action-oriented but not a verbal-based task.
In order to investigate the above hypothesis, children's errors on the standard
verbal task were categorized as phenomenism, realism, or inconsistent errors (i.e.
claims that the shape behind the minifying lens looked "big" but truly was "little").
Then, only the 13 children (i.e. 2, 6 and 5 children in orders 1, 2 and 3 respectively)
who made phenomenism errors on the majority ol the standard verbal trials in this task
(i.e. on three or four trials) were selected for inclusion in the following
analysis.
Because there were only two children in order 1 who made phenomenism errors on
the
majority of standard verbal trials, these data were collapsed acioss order ol
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presentation and a repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of
trials correct.
Figure 9 illustrates the mean proportion of trials correct in each of the three
tasks. As this figure indicates, the differences in performance between the three tasks
were significant, F(2,24)=40.38, p<0.001 . Subsequent post-hoc contrasts using the
Bonferroni adjusted t statistic for K=3 contrasts revealed that the mean proportion of
trials correct in the action task (M=0.67, SDK).30) was significantly higher than that in
the standard verbal task (M=0.06, SD=0.1 1), t(12)=9.17, p<0.001. Likewise, the
proportion of trials correct in the action task also was significantly higher than that in
the separated verbal task (M=0.14, SDK). 17), t(12)=5.78, p<0.001. There was no
significance difference, however, between the proportion of trials correct in the
standard verbal and separated verbal tasks.
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Figure 9. Mean proportion of trials correct for the phenomenism
prone children ot
Experiment 2.
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Finally, in order to examine whether children who were phenomenism prone
performed significantly better in the action task due to their ability to make the
appearance-reality distinction or simply as the result of learning to respond correctly
over the course of the four trials, the number of children who responded correctly on
the first and final trials of this task were identified. Of the 13 children who made
phenomenism errors on the majority of standard verbal trials, 4 responded correctly on
the first trial while 12 responded correctly on the last trial. Although all of the children
who responded correctly on the first trial also responded correctly on the last trial, the
fact that three times this number responded correctly on the last but not the first trial
suggests that the majority of the correct responses by phenomenism prone children in
the action task may have been learned over the course of this task.
Analyses of Errors
Because findings in previous studies using objects with deceptive properties
have found a predominance of phenomenism errors in response to the traditional
appearance-reality questions (see Flavell, 1988 for review), the numbers of errors
classified as phenomenism, realism, or inconsistent were calculated for each child in
the standard verbal and separated verbal tasks separately. Table 10 lists the mean
numbers of each type of error made for each of the two tasks, separately. An order of
presentation (orders 1, 2, 3) x task (standard verbal, separated verbal) x type of error
(phenomenism, realism, inconsistent) mixed-design ANOVA then was conducted on
the numbers of each type of error.
As Table 10 suggests, there was a significant main effect for type of error,
F(2,42)=l 5.627, p<0.001, as well as significant type of error x order of presentation.
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F(4,42)-3.00, p<0.02 and type of error x task interaction, F(2, 42)=7.12, p=0.004.
Finally, there was a significant third-order, type of error x task x order of presentation
interaction, F(4,42)=6.08, p=0.001. There were, however, no significant main effects
for order ot presentation and task or significant order of presentation x task or task x
type of error interactions.
Table 10. Total Number of Errors Made in Experiment 2
Task Phenomenism Realism Inconsistent
Order 1
Standard Verbal 2.00 (SD=1.20) 0.88 (SD= 1.36) 0.38 (SD=0.52)
Separated Verbal 0.38 (SD=0.74) 2.88 (SD=1.13) 0.00 (SD=0.00)
Order 2
Standard Verbal 2.88 (SD=1.36) 0.75 (SD=1 .39) 0.25 (SD=0.46)
Separated Verbal 1.00 (SD=1.07) 1 .88 (SD=0.83) 0.63 (SD=0.92)
Order 3
Standard Verbal 2.5 (SD=1.85) 1.38 (SD= 1.92) 0.00 (SD=0.00)
Separated Verbal 2.75 (SD=1.39) 0.25 (SD=0.46) 0.38 (SD=0.74)
Note. Order l=standard verbal task, action task, separated verbal task, order 2=action
task, separated verbal task, standard verbal task, order 3=separated verbal task,
standard verbal task, action task.
Of primary interest in the current experiment were the differences between the
types of errors and orders of presentation within each of the two tasks (i.e. the standard
verbal and separated verbal tasks). Figure 10 depicts the mean number of each type of
error made in the standard verbal and separated verbal tasks separately.
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Figure 10. Mean number of errors by order of presentation on the standard verbal (top)
and separated verbal tasks (bottom) (PE=Phenomenism, RE=Realism, IE=Inconsistent,
order 1 =standard verbal task, action task, separated verbal task, order 2=action task,
separated verbal task, standard verbal task, order 3=separated verbal task, standard
verbal task, action task).
As Figure 10 illustrates, the pattern of errors in each order of presentation of the
standard verbal task confirmed the expected pattern of errors predicted by the findings
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ot previous traditional appearance-reality studies (see Flavell, 1988 for review). In this
case, children in each order made more phenomenism than either realism or
inconsistent errors. Pairwise comparisons between the three types of errors made in
each order using the Bonferroni adjusted t statistic with K=9 contrasts, however,
revealed only a significant difference between the number of phenomenism and
inconsistent errors of children in order 2 alone, (M=2.88, SD=1 .36 and M=0.25,
SD=0.46, respectively), t(7)=3.88, p<0.05. There were no significant differences
between the number ol phenomenism and realism, phenomenism and inconsistent, or
realism and inconsistent errors in the remaining two orders.
In contrast to the pattern of errors made in the standard verbal task, the pattern
of errors made during the separated verbal task clearly demonstrate that order of
presentation affected the primary types of errors made. In this case, children in orders
1 and 2 committed more realism than phenomenism or inconsistent errors and children
in order 3 performed more phenomenism than realism and inconsistent errors. Again,
pairwise comparisons between the different types of errors were completed for each
order separately using the Bonferroni adjusted t statistic for K=9 contrasts. The results
of these contrasts are presented in Table 1 1. As this table indicates, children in order 3
(i.e. those who were presented with the separated verbal task first) made significantly
more phenomenism than realism errors (M=2.75, SD=1.39 and M=0.25, SD=0.46,
respectively), t(7)=4.18, p<0.05. Conversely, children in order 1 (i.e. those who were
presented with the separated verbal task first) made significantly more realism than
either phenomenism (M=2M, SD=1.13 and M=0.38, SD=0.74, respectively).
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t(7)-4.18, £,0.05, or inconsistent errors (M=0), t(7)=7.22, £<0.01. There were no
additional significant differences in the types of errors made within each group.
Table 1 1 . Results of Pairwise Contrasts on
Separated Verbal Task Errors of Experiment 2
Contrast df t nli
Order 1
Phenomenism v. Realism Errors 7 4.18 <0.05*
Phenomenism v. Inconsistent Errors 7 1.43 >0.05
Realism v. Inconsistent Errors 7 7.22 <0.01*
Order 2
Phenomenism v. Realism Errors 7 1.51 >0.05
Phenomenism v. Inconsistent Errors 7 0.63 >0.05
Realism v. Inconsistent Errors 7 2.38 >0.05
Order 3
Phenomenism v. Realism Errors 7 4.28 <0.05*
Phenomenism v. Inconsistent Errors 7 3.25 >0.05
Realism v. Inconsistent Errors 7 0.55 >0.05
Note. Order l=standard verbal task, action task, separated verbal task, order 2=action
task, separated verbal task, standard verbal task, order 3=separated verbal task,
standard verbal task, action task.
Discussion
The major goal of the current experiment was to examine the action and dual
representation hypotheses using a new method for creating a property-distorting
appearance-reality illusion. In order to do this, a variety of shapes were made to appear
smaller in the dark than they were in the light by painting small,
glow-in-the-dark
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shapes in their centers. Children then were presented with four trials each of three
ditterent tasks, a standard verbal, an action, and a separated verbal task, using these
shapes. The proportion of trials correct was computed for each of the three tasks
separately and the remaining errors in the standard and separated verbal tasks were
classified as phenomenism, realism, or inconsistent errors.
As pointed out in Experiment 1, traditional appearance-reality tasks require
children to think about single objects in terms of how they appear both prior to and
after being transformed by a property-distorting device (e.g. the minifying lens used in
Experiment 1). According to the dual representation hypothesis, it is this need to
assign two conflicting representations to a single object, and not an inability to make
the appearance-reality distinction, that lies at the heart of 3-year-olds' difficulty with
this task. In order to test this hypothesis, this dual representation requirement was
eliminated in the separated-verbal task of the current experiment. As in Experiment 1,
this task created a situation in which children could reason that one of two available
pieces really would fit a target puzzle while the remaining piece only looked like it
would fit the puzzle. This all could happen without children ever having to
acknowledge verbally that a single piece both looked like it would fit but really and
truly was too large or looked too small to fit but really and truly was just right.
Based on the above line of reasoning, it was predicted that children would
correctly answer the appearance-reality questions posed in the separated verbal, but not
standard verbal task if the ability to reason about conflicting dual representations was
the sole reason for their failure in the traditional task. As in Experiment 1, the findings
of the current experiment indicate that eliminating the need to reason about dual
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lepresentations does not result in improved performance, that is, there were no
differences between the separated verbal and standard verbal task performances.
C onsequently, the results of the current experiment provide additional evidence
suggesting that the need to reason about dual representations does not seem to lie at the
heart ot 3-year-olds' difficulties in the traditional appearance-reality task.
The second hypothesis investigated in the current experiment focused on the
language demands of the traditional appearance-reality task. According to this action
hypothesis, children may be confused by the phrases typically used to describe the
distinction (i.e. "looks like to your eyes" and "really and truly"). Consequently, they
may respond to the traditional appearance-reality questions incorrectly despite their
ability to distinguish appearance from reality. In order to eliminate this problem,
children in the current experiment were presented with the action task of Experiment 1
.
When presented with two puzzle pieces that appeared smaller in the light than in the
dark, children were asked to indicate which piece they wished to use in order to
complete a target puzzle. In contrast to Experiment 1, however, children in this task
could actually retrieve the piece and complete the puzzle themselves without any aid
from the experimenter (i.e. based solely on their own actions).
It was predicted that if the primary problem with the traditional task lies in
children's understanding of the language used to describe the distinction, then children
should have performed significantly better in the action task, which completely
eliminated such language, than in the standard verbal and separated verbal tasks. This
indeed was the case: children in each of the three orders of presentation performed
better on the action task than on either the standard verbal or separated tasks.
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Moreover, in contrast to the previous experiment, the majority of children in the
current experiment (i.e. those in order 1 and 2) performed better than that expected by
chance in the action task while performing at or below chance in the verbal tasks. One
possible explanation for why children in order 3 did not perform significantly above
chance in the action task may lay in the fact that this task was the final task presented
in that particular order ol presentation. As a result, their performance in this task may
have been dampened by fatigue effects. Regardless of whether or not this was the case,
however, the overall pattern of action task performance in the current experiment
provides support for the hypothesis that the language requirements of the traditional,
verbal-based appearance-reality task mask 3-year-olds' abilities to distinguish
appearance from reality.
As in Experiment 1
,
one interesting aspect of the improved performance of
children in the action versus the standard and separated verbal tasks was the potential
for learning to occur over trials. Because a correct response in the action task always
involved selecting the smaller of two available pieces in order to complete a target
puzzle, it was possible that the observed improvement in performance in the action task
simply was the results of children learning to pick the small piece without any
understanding of why this selection was correct (i.e. without a true understanding of or
ability to make the appearance-reality distinction). The finding that only 9 of the 24
children tested responded correctly during the very first action trial while 20 of these
children responded correctly during the final action trial suggests that this may have
been the case for the majority of children in the current experiment. Moreover, this
pattern of results was similar for the children who made primarily phenomenism errors
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during the standard verbal task, with only 4 of these children responding correctly
during the very first action trial while 12 responded correetly on the very last trial. In
both cases, the lact that the majority of children who answered the final action task
coirectly did not do so right from the start suggests that improved performance in the
action task may have been the result of children learning to select the smaller of the
two pieces over the course of the four action trials. Although these findings suggest
that some children learned to respond correctly in this task, however, it is important to
note that such findings do not eliminate the possibility that these children actually
learned something about the appearance-reality distinction, rather than simply learning
to select the small piece without any understanding of why that selection was correct.
In light of the above indications of learning in the current experiment, it is
interesting to note that only one study has attempted to provide feedback in the context
of the traditional appearance-reality task. In this study, Flavell, Flavell, and Green
(1983) provided children who had responded incorrectly to the traditional appearance
and/or reality question(s) with explanations for the incorrectness of their answer(s).
Despite this feedback, however, children continued to make similar errors on
subsequent trials of the target task; the presence of feedback had no effect on children's
subsequent abilities to make the distinction verbally.
Perhaps the most reasonable explanation for the difference in the findings of the
action task of the current experiment and those ot Flavell and colleagues (1983) lies in
the type of feedback provided in each task. In the study by Flavell and colleagues, the
experimenter simply explained why a given answer was incorrect. Following this
explanation, the child was presented with the next trial ot the same task and the same
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traditional appearance and reality questions were asked. Beyond being corrected by
the experimenter, there was no observable consequence for continuing to provide the
wrong answers to the questions posed. In the action task of the current experiment, on
the other hand, the feedback provided was more than just a verbal explanation of the
cause of the error. In this case, children could physically observe the reason for the
given error (i.e. the selected piece would not fit the puzzle). As a result, there was a
direct, physically observable consequence for selecting the wrong piece: the puzzle
could not be completed. The presence of this consequence may have motivated
children to think carefully about the distinction during subsequent trials of the action
task. In short, the different type of feedback administered in the action task may lie at
the heart of the learning that appeared to take place in the current experiment, but not
in the study by Flavell et al.
In addition to the above major findings, a final finding that deserves some
attention involves the differences observed between the different orders of presentation
with regard to the types of errors made in the standard and separated verbal tasks.
Based on the findings of previous appearance-reality studies centered on object
properties (e.g. Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1983; see Flavell, 1988 for review), it was
predicted that children would commit more phenomenism errors than realism errors in
the separated verbal task. Although the expected difference in the number of
phenomenism and realism errors committed did not reach significance in the separated
verbal task of the current experiment, it is important to note that the overall pattern ot
errors were in the expected direction, with children making more phenomenism than
realism errors. The pattern of errors obtained in the separated verbal task, on the other
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hand, was very different lrom that predicted by the lindings of previous studies. In this
task, the types of errors made varied as a function of the order in which the three tasks
were presented, with children in order 1 (i.e. those who participated in the standard
verbal, followed by the action and then separated verbal task) committing more realism
than phenomenism errors. A similar error pattern was found in order 2 (i.e. for those
children who participated in the action task, followed by the standard verbal and then
separated verbal tasks), although the observed differences in the number of realism and
phenomenism errors committed did not reach significance.
One possible explanation for the above pattern of errors in the separated verbal
task may lie in the overall similarity between this task and the action task of the current
experiment. In this case, it is important to recognize the fact that the initial set-up of
each task was identical (i.e. in both cases, children were presented with a target puzzle
and two potential pieces). The only difference between the two tasks, therefore,
involved their demands, with the action task requiring children to select the correct
piece to complete the puzzle and the separated verbal task requiring children to answer
the traditional appearance and reality questions regarding the sizes of those pieces.
Because children in orders 1 and 2 both were presented with the action task just prior
to the separated verbal task, they may not have realized that the task demands had
changed. Consequently, they may have continued to select the piece that truly would
fit the puzzle in response to the traditional questions asked in the separated verbal task.
This response pattern would have resulted in the observed predominance of realism
errors in the separated verbal task.
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The above explanation for the observed pattern of errors in the separated verbal
task of orders 1 and 2 seems especially likely in light of the pattern of errors observed
in the separated verbal task of order 3. In this case, children who were presented with
the separated verbal task first, followed by the separated verbal and then action task,
made significantly more phenomenism than realism errors, thereby replicating the
pattern of errors observed in the standard verbal task. Consequently, it is reasonable to
conclude that children's responses to the traditional appearance-reality questions can be
altered based on their prior experiences in alternative tasks.
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CHAPTER 4
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Final Conclusions
Together, the two experiments of the current study sought to address a number
of unresolved issues surrounding 3-year-olds' reasoning about objects that have
deceptive properties. One major goal of Experiment 1 was to examine whether the
poor performance of children in traditional appearance-reality studies is due to a lack
of familiarity with the property-distorting devices typically used rather than a general
inability to make the appearance-reality distinction. Both Experiments 1 and 2 also
sought to determine whether such poor performance might be rooted in the dual
representation requirements of these studies. Finally, the role of the language used to
refer to the appearance-reality distinction in traditional studies, along with the necessity
for children to express their understanding ot this distinction verbally, also was
examined in both experiments. In Experiment l, this was all done using a property-
distorting device typically used in traditional appearance-reality studies (i.e. a
minifying lens), where as a completely new method lor creating an appearance-reality
illusion was used in Experiment 2.
Although no supporting evidence tor the familiarity or dual representations
hypothesis was found, the results of both Experiments 1 and 2 did provide evidence
that the language requirements of the traditional task lie at the heart ot
childiens pooi
performance in traditional appearance-reality studies. This conclusion
stemmed horn
the fact that children performed significantly better in the action
task than in the
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standard verbal task of each experiment. In both experiments, children went from
answering the traditional appearance-reality questions of the standard verbal task on
the basis of available perceptual information (thereby making phenomenism errors) to
making more conceptually-based decisions in the action task. These results, therefore,
extend the findings of Saap et al. (2000) and Gauvain and Greene (1994) regarding
objects that have deceptive identities to situations involving objects that have deceptive
properties. Taken together with the findings of these two studies, the findings of the
current study provide clear evidence that the language demands of the traditional
appearance-reality task mask the ability of 3-year-olds to distinguish appearances from
reality.
As pointed out in Chapter 1
,
the language demands of the traditional, verbal-
based appearance-reality task are two-fold. Not only must children understand the
meanings of the actual phrases typically used to distinguish between the appearances
and reality of target objects, but they also must be willing, able, and motivated to
verbalize both their current perceptions and memories of the original
properties/identities of these objects in the face of repeated questioning by the
experimenter. Consequently, it is possible that children performed better in the action
task than in either of the verbal tasks because the typical phrases used to refer to the
appearance-reality distinction were eliminated in that task. At the same time, however,
it is equally plausible that children's improved action task performance was due to the
fact that this task involved a single, action-oriented response rather than verbal
responses to two separate questions (i.e. an appearance and a reality question).
Because both of the language demands were eliminated in the action task of the current
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study, however, it impossible to know which of these possibilities, if not a combination
of both, is responsible for the obtained results.
Although the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 do converge on the same
conclusion (i.e. that 3-year-olds can distinguish appearance from reality in an action-
oriented but not verbal-based task), it is important to note that the order of presentation
of each of the three tasks appeared to affect the level of performance in the action, but
not the verbal tasks, of each of experiment. In both experiments, children who were
presented with the standard verbal task, followed by the action and separated verbal
tasks, respectively, performed the best on the action task. More specifically, children
in order 1 performed significantly better on the action task than children in order 3 in
Experiment 1, whereas children in order 1 of Experiment 2 performed significantly
better on all three tasks than children in order 2.
As pointed out in the discussion section of Experiment 1
,
the most plausible
explanation for the slightly better action task performances of children in order 1
centers on the presence of warm-up and fatigue effects. With regard to the first effect,
children in order 1 were presented with the action task following the standard verbal
task but before the separated verbal task. As a result, these children had more
experience viewing the deceptive objects through the minifying lens/in the dark, as
well as more time to adjust to the testing procedure, by the time that they were
presented with the action task than children in order 2 (i.e. those who were presented
with the action task first). If such warm-up factors were at the root of the results
obtained, however, children in order 3 (i.e. those who participated in the action task
last) should have performed better on the action task than children in order 1 because
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they had the most time to adjust to the procedure and viewed the most objects through
the minifying lens/in the dark prior to participating in the action task. This, however,
was not the case in either experiment.
When considering the above order effect, it is important to recognize the
possibility that because children in order 3 participated in the action task at the very
end of the testing session, the usefulness of the proposed "warm-up" factors may have
been cancelled out by fatigue. If this were the case, however, then there should have
been similar signs of fatigue during the final tasks of orders 1 and 2 as well (i.e. the
separated verbal and standard verbal tasks, respectively). Unfortunately, it is
impossible to know whether performance in the final tasks of orders 1 and 2 were
affected by fatigue because performance in these tasks (i.e. the standard verbal and
separated verbal tasks) was at floor in each of the three orders. With this in mind, the
combination of warm-up and fatigue effects mentioned here may provide the most
reasonable explanation for the improved action task performances of children in order
1 for both Experiments 1 and 2.
In addition to considering the above findings of Experiments 1 and 2, it is
important to recognize that several interesting differences between these experiments
did exist. For example, the majority of the children tested in Experiment 2 performed
significantly above chance in the action task. This, however, was not the case in
Experiment 1 . One possible explanation for this difference may lie in the fact that the
procedure of the action task of Experiment 1 was slightly more complex than that of
Experiment 2. In Experiment 1, children could not retrieve the piece that they wished
to use in order to complete the target puzzle with a direct reach. Rather,
they had to
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indicate the location of the desired piece first (either verbally, or by pointing to it) in
order for the experimenter to retrieve it for them. Only then could they use the desired
piece to complete the puzzle. As pointed out in C hapter 3, this extra step in the
response process of Experiment 1 was the consequence ot the property-distorting
device used in that experiment; children could not make a direct reach for the piece that
they desired without first removing the minifying lens from in front of the pieces. If
they did this, however, the crucial appearance-reality illusion would be lost, thereby
defeating the purpose of using the lens in the first place.
In Experiment 2, the above complication was eliminated by using glow-in-the-
dark objects to create the crucial appearance-reality illusion. In this case, children
could make a direct reach for the piece that they desired without ever interfering with
the illusion. Consequently, children in this experiment had more control over their
selections than children in Experiment 1 . This increased control may have motivated
them to think about the appearance-reality distinction more carefully in Experiment 2
than in Experiment 1 . Moreover, it also may have helped them to better understand the
general procedure and goals of the task (i.e. to complete the puzzle rather than to
answer the question posed by the experimenter). Taken together, these possibilities
may explain why children performed above chance in the action task of Experiment 2
but not Experiment 1
.
A second difference between the action task findings ot the two experiments
presented here involves the evidence for learning found in Experiment 2 but not
Experiment 1. In this case, more than 50% of the children in Experiment 1 responded
correctly on the very first action trial. Moreover, 67% of these children continued to
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respond correctly on the majority ot the remaining 3 trials, suggesting that they were
able to distinguish appearances from reality consistently in that task. In Experiment 2,
however, only 38% of the children responded correctly on the very first action trial.
By the final trial of this task, however, nearly 85% of the children responded correctly.
As pointed out in Chapter 4, these findings suggest that the majority of children in
Experiment 2, but not 1
,
learned to responded correctly over the course of the four
action trials, most likely as the result of the feedback provided in this task.
In general, several possible explanations may account for the above findings.
On the one hand, it is possible that the illusion created by the glow-in-the-dark objects
was more salient than that created by the minifying lens. As a result, it may have been
easier for children to overcome the illusion of Experiment 1 than it was for them to
overcome that of Experiment 2. A second, equally plausible explanation may lie in the
fact the property-distorting device used in Experiment 1 (i.e. the minifying lens) was
clearly present throughout this task. Consequently, the lens may have provided a
reminder that the appearances of the available pieces had been altered which in turn,
may have served as a reminder of the need to override the deceptive appearances of
these pieces. Children in Experiment 2, on the other hand, had no such visual reminder
of the altered appearances of the available pieces. Moreover, only the appearances ot
these pieces, and not the puzzles themselves, were altered in the dark, thereby
providing children with conflicting information regarding the crucial illusion ot this
experiment. In this case, turning oft the light changed the size ot some, but not all of
the target objects. This fact may have caused some initial confusion tor children and
consequently, may have resulted in the low number of correct responses duiing the
first
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trial. The feedback received during this trial, however, may have helped to clarify the
situation tor children, which in turn, may have resulted in the high number of correct
responses achieved during the final, but not first trials of this task.
Perhaps as important as the observed differences between Experiments 1 and 2
just discussed is the similarity in their patterns of correct responses over each of the
three ditterent tasks. In this case, it is important to note that the majority of children in
both Experiments 1 and 2 performed poorly in the standard and separated verbal tasks
while performing significantly better in the action task. This similarity suggests that
the glow-in-the-dark objects of Experiment 2 created an appearance-reality illusion that
was comparable to the illusion created by the minifying lens of Experiment 1.
Consequently, the results of the current study suggest that asking children to reason
about and act upon glow-in-the-dark objects provides a new means by which young
children's abilities to distinguish appearances from reality can be examined.
Future Directions
Although it is clear from the results of the current study that children can reason
and learn about the appearance-reality distinction in an action-oriented, but not
language-based task, several questions do remain. As pointed out previously, the
action task of the current study differed from the traditional, language-based task in a
number of ways. First, the language of the traditional appearance-reality questions was
eliminated all together; the phrases typically used to describe the distinction in the
traditional task never were mentioned in the action task. Moreover, instead ol asking
children to verbally respond to a series of two questions in order test their ability to
make this distinction, children in the action task were asked to perform a single action
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(i.e. complete the puzzle). Consequently, the action task also changed the method of
response from a verbal-based response to an action-oriented one. Finally, in contrast to
the traditional appearance-reality task, the action task also carried a direct, physically
observable consequence for failing to distinguish between the appearances and reality
of the target objects. In this case, the major goal of the task (i.e. completion of a
puzzle) could not be achieve unless the appearance-reality distinction was made.
As the long list of differences just presented suggests, it is impossible to know
which one was responsible for the ultimate success of children in the action task of the
current study. Each of the above differences provides an equally plausible explanation.
For instance, it is possible that the mere elimination of the phrases traditionally used to
describe the appearance-reality distinction (i.e. "really and truly" and "looks like to
your eyes") may be responsible for children's ultimate success in the action task. This
possibility is supported by studies that have found that the mere substitution of
different phrases to describe this distinction results in improved performance in
traditional, language-based appearance-reality tasks (e.g. Flavell, Flavell, et al., 1987;
Flavell, Green, et al., 1987; Krause & Saamio,1993). At the same time, however, it is
equally plausible that eliminating the verbal-response requirement of the traditional
task was the key to children's successful action task performance. In this case, studies
that have found that children can express their understanding of the appearance-reality
distinction in actions, but not in words, provide support tor this conclusion (e.g.
Gauvain & Greene, 1994; Saap, et al., 2000, McCarty et al., 2002). Finally, it is
possible that the fact that there were direct, physically observable consequences
tor
failing to make the appearance-reality distinction in the action task ot the current
study
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may have motivated children to reason about this distinction. In this case, studies that
have found that children perform significantly better in action-oriented tasks in which
making the appearance-reality distinction is crucial for success than on verbal -based
tasks also support this conclusion (e.g. Taylor & Hort, 1990; Saap et al., 2000).
Clearly, further work must be done in order to determine which of these factors, or
combination of factors, is responsible for the results of the current study.
The question of why children in Experiment 2, but not Experiment 1 , appeared
to have learned to make the appearance-reality distinction in the action task of the
current study also provides an impetus for future research. As pointed out in Chapter
3, providing feedback in the context of the traditional appearance reality-task has only
been attempted in one previous study. In this study, Flavell, Flavell, and Green (1983)
provided children who had responded incorrectly to the traditional appearance and/or
reality question(s) with explanations for the incorrectness of their answer(s). Despite
this feedback, however, children continued to make similar errors on subsequent trials
of the target task; the presence of feedback had no effect on children's subsequent
abilities to make the distinction verbally. Taken together with the fact that children in
Experiment 1 did not exhibit any such learning effects, the results of this study clearly
point to the need for replication of the learning effects observed in Experiment 2.
In addition to the above need for replication, an investigation ol the hypothesis
regarding the observed learning effects of Experiment 2 also is necessary. It was
reasoned that children in Experiment 2 may have learned to make the correct response
in the action task based on the physically observable feedback that they
received
regarding the incorrectness of their initial selections (i.e. the selected
piece did not tit
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the puzzle). If this were the case, one would expect such learning effects to disappear
when this type ol feedback is eliminated. Consequently, this hypothesis could be
tested in an experiment that presented children with different types of feedback in an
action-oriented task (i.e. direct, physically observable feedback, verbal feedback alone,
and no feedback at all). If the key to children's learning about this distinction lies in
the type of feedback presented, then the presence of such learning should vary as the
result of the type of feedback used.
Lastly, the more global question of exactly how the ability to distinguish
appearances from reality develops provides a third, interesting area for future research.
Clearly, the findings of the current study suggest that children can reason about the
appearance-reality distinction in an action-oriented task before they can do so in a
verbal-based task. Such findings, however, do not explain how this ability develops or
why this would be the case. Consequently, the stage is set for future work examining
just how the development of the ability to reason about deceptive objects develops.
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APPENDIX
LIST OF PUZZLES AND SHAPES
The following contains a list of the puzzles and shapes used during
Experiments 1 and 2. The puzzles and shapes are listed in the order that they were
presented during the puzzle familiarization period, standard verbal, action, and
separated verbal tasks of each session.
Puzzle familiarization
• Smiley face with a fluorescent yellow triangle missing from its center
• Ice cream cone with a fluorescent pink heart missing from the ice cream
• Two balloons with a fluorescent green square missing from one balloon
• Flower with a fluorescent blue circle missing from its center
Standard verbal task
• Fluorescent yellow triangle
• Fluorescent pink heart
• Fluorescent green square
• Fluorescent blue circle
Action task
• Kite with a fluorescent yellow triangle missing from its center
• Butterfly with a fluorescent pink heart missing from its left wing
• Mitten with a fluorescent green square missing from its center
• Tulip with a fluorescent blue circle missing from its center
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Separated verbal task
• Star with a fluorescent yellow triangle missing from its center
• Open umbrella with a fluorescent pink heart missing from its center
• Fish with fluorescent green square missing from its center
• Snail with a fluorescent blue circle missing from the center of its shell
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